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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE MAKING OF THE SECOND REHNQUIST COURT:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

THOMAS W. MERRILL*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court is implicitly assumed to have a certain unity of
character under each Chief Justice. Hence, we refer to the “Marshall Court,”
the “Warren Court,” and the “Rehnquist Court.” A closer look at history
reveals that this assumption of a natural Court defined by the tenure of each
Chief Justice is often misleading. The Marshall Court had a different character
late in its life than it did in its early years.1 Similarly, the Warren Court
became distinctively more liberal and activist after 1962 when Felix
Frankfurter retired and was replaced by Arthur Goldberg.2
Although the Rehnquist Court is still with us, we can already perceive that
there have been two Rehnquist Courts. The first Rehnquist Court lasted from
October 1986 to July 1994. It featured frequent membership changes, a
relatively full (but declining) calendar of argued cases, and majority coalitions
that shifted from issue to issue. The questions that commanded the most
* John Paul Stevens Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. Helpful leads,
suggestions, and corrections were provided by Ron Allen, Bob Bennett, Rick Brooks, Steve
Calabresi, David Dana, Shari Diamond, Tracey George, Joel Goldstein, Heidi Kitrosser, Bill
Marshall, Eric Muller, Emerson Tiller, and Albert Yoon. I have also benefited from workshop
discussions at North Carolina and Penn Law Schools. Gene DeAngelis provided valuable
research assistance.
I am especially grateful for the many fine and thoughtful commentaries on the lecture
published in this issue. Although each of the commentators offers important insights and
qualifications that ideally would result in modifications to the lecture, I have not made such
changes in order to avoid creating a “moving target” problem for the commentators. Thus, my
failure to acknowledge or respond to the commentators’ criticisms should not be taken to imply
either that I agree or disagree with them, and it most certainly does not mean that I regard them as
without force.
1. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 127-28 (1985) (noting that after a period of “remarkable
unanimity,” differences of opinion began to emerge on the Marshall Court after 1827 as
Marshall’s earlier colleagues were supplanted by new appointees).
2. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 415 (1990) (denominating the period after Frankfurter’s retirement “The
Real Warren Court”).
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attention were social issues, such as abortion (and in particular whether Roe v.
Wade3 would be overruled), other privacy issues like the right to die,
affirmative action, and government speech on religious topics (such as school
prayer and crèches in city hall). Yet, notwithstanding its attention to these
issues, the Court produced relatively few important doctrinal innovations in
these areas, and high-profile cases often ended up with no opinion
commanding the support of five Justices.
The second Rehnquist Court started in October 1994 and is still with us.
This Court has had no change in its membership, has decided just half the
number of cases the Court did in 1986, and is increasingly dominated by a
single bloc of five Justices. Social issues like abortion, affirmative action, and
school prayer have significantly receded from the scene. Instead, the dominant
theme of the second Rehnquist Court has been constitutional federalism,
including the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause and Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth Amendment limitations on federal
power, and state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits reflected in the
Eleventh Amendment. The Court has generated a number of important
innovations in the interpretation of these provisions, nearly always in decisions
in which the controlling opinion garners exactly five votes. These innovations,
together with other controversial 5-4 decisions like Bush v. Gore4 and Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,5 have evoked heated accusations that we have
entered a new era of “judicial sovereignty.”6
I am not the first to observe that the Rehnquist Court took a distinctive turn
in the mid-1990s, nor to seek an explanation for this change. Indeed, three
notable attempts to explain the Rehnquist Court’s behavior have recently been
advanced by legal scholars. John McGinnis, in a sympathetic account, has
argued the Rehnquist Court’s recent decisions reflect a pervasive concern with
fostering localism and associational autonomy.7 Chris Schroeder, in a less
sympathetic vein, has suggested the Court’s new jurisprudence reflects a
general decline in trust in the federal government dating from the War in
Vietnam and Watergate.8 Jed Rubenfeld, in the least sympathetic effort to find

3.
4.
5.
6.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 14 (2001). Kramer is hardly alone in accusing the Rehnquist Court of turning to a new
form of activism after the mid-1990s. See, e.g., Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY
L.J. 481 (2002); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80
(2001).
7. See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002).
8. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional
Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307 (2001).
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a unifying theme, thinks the new concern with constitutional federalism is a
cover for the majority’s hostility to extensions of antidiscrimination law
beyond traditional concerns about invidious race and gender discrimination.9
I will forego any such ideational approach to understanding the second
Rehnquist Court, largely because I am not persuaded that the Court’s recent
behavior can be neatly subsumed under any single conceptual rubric.
McGinnis’s devolutionary theory, for example, cannot account for the
continued willingness of the Court to find state laws preempted by federal
regulation, to strike down discriminatory state laws under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, and to eliminate state experimentation with
different sorts of electoral regimes under an ever-expanding First
Amendment.10 Schroeder’s account suffers from the same failings, and it
cannot explain why the decline in trust in the federal government began to
affect the Court only in the mid-1990s, nor why it has affected only five of the
nine Justices. Likewise, Rubenfeld’s hypothesis of hostility toward newer
antidiscrimination laws cannot explain why the Court has also invoked
constitutional federalism to invalidate federal environmental laws, gun control
laws, protections for intellectual property rights, causes of action against false
advertising, and regulations that protect cruise ships that offer casino
gambling.11
Instead of explaining the emergence of the second Rehnquist Court in
terms of some unifying Weltanschauung, I will search for answers using the
harsh realism of political science. In particular, I will borrow from recent
writings of political scientists who specialize in the study the Supreme Court.
My objective is not to pass myself off as a political scientist. I am not—I am a
law professor. However, I believe that law professors have a good deal to
learn by paying more attention to what political scientists have been writing
about courts. Moreover, I suspect that political scientists have something to
9. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002).
10. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding state products
liability action impliedly preempted by policy of federal regulatory agency); Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding state law prohibiting state from purchasing
goods and services from Burma invalid under dormant Commerce Clause); Cal. Democratic Party
v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (holding that California’s experiment with blanket primary election
system violates the First Amendment); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S.
182 (1999) (holding state restrictions on ballot initiatives violate First Amendment).
11. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (ability of federal
agency to hear complaint about discrimination against cruise ships that offer casino gambling);
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001) (authority of EPA to regulate isolated waters); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (federal regulation of false advertising);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (federal
protection of patent rights); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (federal gun control
law).
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learn by paying attention to what law professors perceive to be happening on
the Court. One of my goals in this lecture is to play the role of the go-between
between these two groups of scholars, who tend to operate in isolation from
each other. In drawing upon models from political science, I hope to
encourage lawyers to make greater use of those models in their own work.
Likewise, in discussing some recent developments on the Rehnquist Court,
which may be more familiar to lawyers, I hope to stimulate political scientists
to take a closer look at the changing behavior of the Rehnquist Court, using
their superior empirical and model-building skills.
In this connection I could not be more pleased by the panel of
commentators who have written responses to this lecture. They include some
of the country’s leading political scientists who study the Court, and some of
the country’s most astute legal observers of the Court. To a man and woman,
each of them has displayed an unusual degree of awareness of the work of the
other discipline. So this is a very auspicious group to inaugurate greater
dialogue between these two disciplines about our collective understanding of
an institution like the Supreme Court.
Recent political science literature has advanced three different hypotheses
about judicial behavior.12 I will draw upon each of these hypotheses in seeking
to explain the two Rehnquist Courts, and, for good measure, toss in a fourth,
which as far as I know has not been previously used to explain Supreme Court
behavior.
The first hypothesis of the political scientists, which is the most
reductionistic, is called the attitudinal model.13 It hypothesizes that the Justices
vote reflexively in each case for the outcome that conforms most closely to
their personal public policy preferences. Justices pay no attention to how other
Justices are likely to vote or how other institutions are likely to react to their
decisions. Furthermore, they engage in no logrolling or vote trading, even
implicitly. Under this theory, the doctrine produced by the Court is a function
of a summing of the individual policy preferences of each of the Justices.
The second hypothesis, which I will call the internal strategic actor
hypothesis, modifies the simple attitudinal model by pointing out that it takes a
majority of sitting Justices to produce an opinion that is regarded as a legally
binding precedent.14 Consequently, in an effort to produce such precedents,
12. For overviews, see LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Frank B. Cross, The Justices of
Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511 (1998) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE (1998)).
13. See SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF
PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992 (1995); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
14. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12; FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW
ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000).
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Justices are likely to modify their personal preferences by taking into account
the preferences of the other Justices, at least four of whom must be persuaded
to go along to form a controlling opinion. Under this theory, the doctrine
produced by the Court will often be determined by the views of the median or
“swing” Justice on any particular issue, with other Justices tempering their
views to conform to those of the Justice with the critical fifth vote.
The third hypothesis, which I will call the external strategic actor model,
further modifies the inquiry by pointing out that the decisions reached by the
Court are often subject to resistance from, or modification by, other political
institutions such as Congress and the Executive.15 Thus, a Justice who cares
about advancing his or her personal policy preferences will take into account
the preferences of these other institutions. Such an externally-oriented Justice
will also want to consider public opinion, insofar as public opinion translates
into potential opposition by other political institutions or into other reputational
costs for Justices. Under this theory, the doctrine produced by the Court is a
function not only of the policy preferences of the Justices, but also of their
assessment of how far those preferences are sustainable given the probable
reaction of those outside the Court.
Finally, I offer a fourth hypothesis, based on the differences between a
Court experiencing extensive personnel changes, which I call a Court in flux,
and a Court experiencing no personnel changes, which I call a Court in stasis.
A Court in flux is more likely to change its institutional norms than a Court in
stasis because new Justices are more likely to be the source of, and to be
receptive to, new ideas about institutional behavior. In contrast, a Court in
stasis will have more collective information about the preferences of each of
the Justices than will a Court in flux. This should mean that the Justices on a
Court in stasis will make fewer “mistakes” in predicting the positions of other
Justices. Similarly, the Justices on a Court in stasis will have participated in
more decisions with the other Justices, which should allow bonds of
cooperation to develop more fully than on a Court in flux.
Each of these four hypotheses can be applied in intriguing ways to the
contrasting behavior of the first and second Rehnquist Courts. Indeed, if I
accomplish nothing else in this lecture, I hope I can inspire political scientists
to take up the differences in the Rehnquist Court before and after 1994 as an
appropriate subject for further investigation. My efforts at application will
necessarily be tentative and impressionistic.
Part II of the lecture develops in greater detail the case that there have been
two Rehnquist Courts. I focus in particular on five phenomena: differences in
personnel and rates of change in personnel; differences in the number of cases
heard by the Court; a shift in emphasis from cases presenting social issues to
15. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 138-77; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on
History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991).
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cases presenting issues of constitutional federalism; differences in the number
of 5-4 decisions and the willingness of the Justices to adopt important legal
innovations in 5-4 decisions; and differences in the number of plurality
decisions.
Part III takes up the attitudinal model. At first blush, it might seem that
this model would predict no change over the span of the Rehnquist Court. The
first Rehnquist Court started out with what has been characterized as a 5-4
conservative/liberal split. After the dust settled in 1994 and all the personnel
changes were completed, the second Rehnquist Court was also characterized
by a 5-4 conservative/liberal split. When we look more closely at the
personnel changes that occurred, however, we find a potentially significant
juxtaposition. Of the five conservatives who composed the majority in the
original Rehnquist Court, one—Byron White—was, in fact, an old fashioned
New Deal liberal. White believed in judicial restraint in cases involving social
issues, but he also believed in a strong federal government and was skeptical
about claims of states’ rights. This mix of beliefs translated into conservative
votes on social issues like abortion and gay rights, but liberal votes on issues of
separation of powers and federalism. White’s replacement in the second
Rehnquist Court, not directly, but indirectly, was Clarence Thomas.16 Thomas,
like White, is a conservative on social issues, but, unlike White, he is also
conservative on issues such a constitutional federalism. Thus, at least one of
the defining traits of the second Rehnquist Court—the emergence of an
aggressively conservative jurisprudence in the area of constitutional
federalism—can be explained in part by the substitution of Thomas for White.
Justice Thomas, of course, is only one Justice out of a majority coalition of
five. In Part IV, I turn to the internal strategic actor hypothesis in order to
consider whether it can account for the allegiance of other members of that
coalition. In particular, I will consider the possibility that the contrast between
the first and second Rehnquist Courts can be attributed in part to the strategic
behavior of Antonin Scalia. When he joined the Court, Justice Scalia was an
ardent proponent of the conservative agenda on social issues, but he was, at
best, indifferent toward states’ rights. A strategic actor who held these
preferences would have rationally concentrated his energies during the first
Rehnquist Court on social issues. At that time, there was reason to believe
that, with further retirements of liberal Justices and their replacement by
Republican appointees, the Court would begin to achieve important substantive
changes on issues like abortion, other privacy rights, affirmative action, and
school prayer. These hopes, however, were dashed. The watershed decision in

16. Thomas, a conservative, replaced Thurgood Marshall, a liberal, in 1991. White, a
conservative, was replaced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a liberal, in 1993. The net effect was a
conservative for a conservative, and a liberal for a liberal.
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey17 in 1992 revealed
that Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter (all Republican appointees) did
not support overruling Roe v. Wade.18 The retirement of Justice White in 1993
doomed any further effort along these lines for the foreseeable future.
In contrast to the grim prognosis on the social issues front in 1994, the
prospect for doctrinal innovation in federalism cases was much brighter.
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy had proven to be much more consistently
supportive of states’ rights than of rolling back individual rights in areas
involving social issues. In these circumstances, a strategic actor in Justice
Scalia’s position could rationally conclude that his first set of preferences—
social issues—should be put on the back burner, and his energies redirected to
advancing what had theretofore been, at best, a secondary preference—states’
rights. Although I have no conclusive evidence that Justice Scalia, in fact,
made such a strategic choice, there is circumstantial evidence that something
like this happened. In any event, the Court altered its agenda in the mid-1990s
away from social issues to federalism issues, and Justice Scalia, in alliance
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas,
became a steadfast proponent of limiting congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendments, and of erecting new
protections for states’ rights in the name of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments.
In Part V, I turn to the third hypothesis of the political scientists—that the
Justices take into account the views of external institutions and forces. This
theory maps very nicely onto the contrast between the first and second
Rehnquist Courts because the transition in the Court’s behavior coincides
almost exactly with a reversal in control of the Executive and the Legislative
Branches of the federal government. During the first Rehnquist Court, the
Republicans controlled the White House and the Democrats controlled both
Houses of Congress. After Bill Clinton became President in 1993 and the
Republicans took over Congress in the elections of 1994, this pattern was
reversed. Under the external strategic actor hypothesis, therefore, one would
expect the first Rehnquist Court to follow the lead of the Executive Branch in
moving the law as far as possible in a conservative direction without triggering
a backlash from Congress, whereas the second Rehnquist Court would ignore
the views of the Executive Branch and freely impose its own preferences, so
long as these remain to the left of the views of the Republicans who control the
key committees of Congress. The evidence in support of this hypothesis,
however, is weak. In matters of statutory interpretation, where one would
expect to see the most pronounced effect of a reversal of control of the
Legislative and Executive branches, we see the exact opposite of what the
17. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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external strategic actor model would predict: the second Rehnquist Court was,
in fact, more deferential to executive legal interpretations than was the first
Rehnquist Court.
On the other hand, it can plausibly be argued that public opinion played an
important role in one of the key changes that led to the second Rehnquist
Court: the “apostasy” of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in 1992 on
abortion and school prayer. In particular, the failed nomination of Robert
Bork, the barely successful nomination of Clarence Thomas, and the adoption
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 revealed intense opposition to the conservative
agenda on abortion, other privacy issues, and issues of race and gender
discrimination. This demonstration of hostile public opinion may have been
enough to persuade the Court—or more accurately, its three moderate
conservatives—either to abandon the conservative coalition altogether
(Souter), or at least to steer clear of controversial rulings on social issues as
much as possible (O’Connor and Kennedy). This, more than any other theory,
explains the shift away from the high-profile social issues cases to the more
obscure issues of constitutional federalism, which tend to fly below the radar
screen of public awareness.
The fourth hypothesis, which is considered in Part VI, directs our attention
to the different types of behaviors that are likely to prevail on a Court in stasis
as opposed to a Court in flux. This hypothesis can plausibly explain three of
the differentiating characteristics between the first and second Rehnquist
Courts. First, the greater receptivity of a Court in flux to new institutional
norms offers the best explanation of why the size of the Court’s docket shrank
so dramatically during the years of the first Rehnquist Court. Second, the
superior collective information of a Court in stasis may account for the decline
in plurality decisions on the second Rehnquist Court relative to the first.
Lastly, the stronger commitment of coalition members to cooperation and
reciprocity on a Court in stasis may explain why we see increasing numbers of
5-4 decisions on the second Rehnquist Court, and why those decisions have
increasingly announced significant legal innovations.
II. A PORTRAIT OF TWO COURTS
There are, of course, a number of points of continuity over the sixteen-year
span of the Rehnquist Court, as indeed there are points of continuity between
the Rehnquist Court and the Burger Court—and as there will be between the
Rehnquist Court and whatever follows it. There are, however, also a striking
number of differences between the Court that convened on the first Monday in
October in 1986 and the Court that sits today. Cumulatively, those differences
are sufficiently great to justify speaking of two Rehnquist Courts—the first
Rehnquist Court, which sat from the fall of 1986 to the summer of 1994, and
the second Rehnquist Court, which has sat from the fall of 1994 to the present.
At least that is the premise on which this lecture proceeds.
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The most obvious difference—and the one that ultimately drives all
others—is personnel. The Court that adjourned in the summer of 1986
contained six Justices who were no longer sitting when the Court convened in
October 1994. In fact, the first point of contrast between the two Courts is that
the first Rehnquist Court was characterized by a fairly steady rate of turnover
in personnel—six replacements in eight years—whereas the second Rehnquist
Court has been characterized by a nearly unprecedented stability in
membership—no changes in over eight years. Not since the 1820s has a single
group of Justices sat together for such a long unbroken period of time, and the
Court of the 1820s contained only seven Justices.19 The basic contrast between
a Court in flux and a Court of fixed composition will serve as a critical variable
in my efforts in Part VI to explain the differences between the two Courts.
One might think that a turnover of six Justices in eight years would
produce a significant shift in the political orientation of the Court. Indeed,
given the way the retirements were spaced, the conservatives should have
picked up one seat. Three retirements were from the conservative wing and
three were from the liberal wing. They were replaced by four Justices
nominated by Republican Presidents—two by Reagan and two by Bush
senior—and two by a Democratic President—Clinton. In theory, therefore, the
Republican Presidents should have been able to gain one conservative seat on
the Court. This did not happen, however, because of a miscalculation by the
first Bush Administration. President Bush replaced the retiring Justice William
Brennan—the leader of the liberal wing—with David Souter—a reclusive and
little-known judge from New Hampshire. After a couple years of uncertainty,
Souter fell in with the liberal camp, where he remains firmly ensconced today.
The upshot is that three conservatives were replaced by three other
conservatives, and three liberals were replaced by three other liberals, so the
general political balance on the Court remained undisturbed. Figure 1 on the
next page summarizes the changes in personnel that have occurred during the
years of the Rehnquist Court.

19. See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting
the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 MINN. L. REV. 131, 134 n.12 (2001).
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FIGURE 1
Changes in Court Personnel, 1987-2002
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Turning from personnel changes, perhaps the most striking difference in
institutional behavior between the first and second Rehnquist Courts concerns
the number of cases decided on the merits. During all the years of the Burger
Court and up through the first year of the Rehnquist Court, the Court decided
about 150 cases per year. During the years of the second Rehnquist Court, the
Court has decided only about half that many cases. For seasoned observers,
this is a truly stunning development. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was commonly
assumed that 150 cases per year was the outer limit of the Court’s capacity,
and that a serious problem was presented by the inability of the Court to go
beyond this limit.20 For the last eight years—the years of the second Rehnquist
Court—the Court has been operating at about half this capacity. This is
vividly illustrated by the Court’s daily schedule. The Court’s schedule is
designed on the assumption that the Court will hear two argued cases in the
morning, take a one-hour break for lunch, and then hear two argued cases in
the afternoon. The second Rehnquist Court has only rarely needed an

20. See Peter L. Strauss, One-Hundred-Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093 (1987).
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afternoon argument session. The Justices break for lunch and call it quits for
the day.
FIGURE 2
Opinions Written by Term, 1986-2001
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Figure 2 above traces the decline in the number of cases decided by the
Rehnquist Court on a year-by-year basis.21 We see that the second Rehnquist
Court is readily distinguishable from the first by the fact that it generates a
much smaller body of precedent. In theory, the decisions it renders could have
greater impact because the Court can devote more time to each case. As we
shall see, the second Rehnquist Court does produce fewer plurality decisions
than the first Rehnquist Court. It is debatable, however, whether the second
Rehnquist Court otherwise is writing opinions of greater clarity or sweep than
its predecessors.22 What is clear is that a Court that writes half as many
21. The numbers are taken from the statistics compiled in the annual Supreme Court volume
of the Harvard Law Review published each November. They reflect a category that the Review
calls “opinions written,” which varies slightly from cases orally argued because it includes some
per curiam decisions in which the Court does not hear argument and excludes some cases that are
dismissed after argument without a decision. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The
Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453 (2002).
22. It does appear that opinions have become longer over time. Full Court opinions by the
Rehnquist Court are on average more than twice as long as full Court opinions during the Taft
Court (1921-28). See Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent,
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opinions necessarily has fewer occasions to influence policy. Why a Court
would abdicate power in this fashion is a central mystery of the second
Rehnquist Court.
Sheer numbers of decisions are one thing. Perhaps more importantly, the
nature of the legal issues resolved by the Court—its legal agenda—is also
significantly different before and after 1994. To be sure, we inevitably find a
substantial degree of continuity with the past. The second Rehnquist Court,
like the first—and like previous Courts—decides a mixture of constitutional
and nonconstitutional cases. The constitutional cases present a wide diversity
of issues, ranging from procedural protections for criminal defendants, to free
speech, to government takings of property, to disputes about relations between
the federal government and the states and among the three branches of the
federal government. Yet, if we focus only on the relatively thin slice of
constitutional cases that generate the most public comment and controversy,
we find a significant shift in emphasis between the first and second Rehnquist
Courts.
The shift can be illustrated by considering two “baskets” of issues, one
which I will call the “social issues” basket, and the other the “federalism”
basket. The social issues basket includes cases involving constitutional
protection of abortion, other privacy rights such as parental rights and the right
to die, affirmative action, gay rights, and government speech on religious
topics (for example, school prayer and crèches in city hall). These are the
“culture war” issues that sharply divide liberal urban elites and the
predominantly rural and suburban religious right.23 The federalism basket
includes cases involving the scope of federal power under the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth Amendment
limitations on federal power, and state immunity from suit associated with the
Eleventh Amendment. These cases are perceived, at least by most nonlawyers,
as presenting relatively technical issues whose relevance to questions of public
Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1281 (2001).
Even more striking, however, is the rise of dissenting (and concurring) opinions. During the Taft
Court, 84% of opinions were unanimous; today that number has fallen to 27%. Id. at 1283.
23. The judgment about what issues to include in the “social issues” basket is a subjective
one, and other observers might quarrel with my exclusion of certain categories of cases, such as
obscenity cases, death penalty cases, other types of Establishment Clause cases (such as school
vouchers), and perhaps even cases involving legislative redistricting. I have selected the issues to
include in the social issues basket based upon my judgment about those issues that present the
sharpest and most intense divisions within society. Although obscenity, the death penalty, and so
forth are divisive, they do not pose the same sharp cleavage along “culture war” lines as do the
issues I have included. For example, many feminists support stronger regulation of obscenity,
and new Democrats like Bill Clinton support the death penalty. In any event, if the social issues
basket was expanded to include issues like obscenity and the death penalty, we would still see a
shift away from these issues between the first and second Rehnquist Courts, although the shift
would not be as pronounced as it is when we focus on my narrow definition of social issues.
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policy is not immediately apparent. Figure 3 below presents a histogram that
compares the relative distribution of social issues and federalism issues
between the first and second Rehnquist Courts. With respect to the social
issues basket, it shows a decline of nearly 50% in the number of significant
cases decided—from seventeen during the first eight years to just nine in the
second eight years. In contrast, with respect to the federalism basket, the
number of significant cases nearly doubled—from thirteen in the first eight
years to twenty-five in the second eight years.24
FIGURE 3
Relative Frequency of Social Issues and Federalism Issues

25
25

20
17
15
No. Lead
Opinions

9

13

10
5
19
95
-02
lism

19
87
-94

Fe
de
ra

So

cia
l

0

When we go beyond a purely quantitative analysis and consider the role
that some specific issues have played in the two periods, we find even more
dramatic evidence of change. Abortion is the best example. The first
Rehnquist Court heard five cases in eight years involving the substantive right

24. The cases used to generate Figure 3 are listed in Appendix A at the end of this lecture.
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to an abortion;25 the second Rehnquist Court heard only one such case in eight
years.26 This understates, however, the degree to which abortion was a
dominating theme of the first Rehnquist Court and yet has had only a shadowy
presence in the second. There was high drama in the first Rehnquist Court
over the question whether the Court would overrule Roe v. Wade,27 its
landmark 1973 decision that first recognized a constitutional right to abortion.
The Reagan Administration asked the Court to overrule Roe at the tail end of
the Burger Court,28 and again in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services29 in
the opening years of the Rehnquist Court. Four Justices signaled a willingness
to do so. The Bush administration persisted in the assault on Roe, until the
Court, in its dramatic decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,30 reaffirmed the basic holding in Roe.
With the Casey decision, the Court clearly lost its appetite for high stakes
abortion controversies. With the exception of Stenberg v. Carhart,31 where a
square circuit conflict left it no choice but to rule on the constitutionality of
partial birth abortion bans, the second Rehnquist Court has avoided public
debate about abortion rights. The second Rehnquist Court has, in fact, decided
a number of cases involving abortion rights; however, with the exception of
Stenberg, it has done so in per curium opinions without hearing argument.32 It
is most unusual for the Court to resolve substantive constitutional issues in this
fashion. Moreover, the Court has continued to decide cases at the periphery of
the abortion controversy, such as those involving civil and criminal
prosecutions of anti-abortion demonstrators.33 It clearly has no interest,
however, in reengaging in a publicly visible way with the core question of
whether or to what extent abortion is a substantively protected right.

25. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
26. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
27. 410 U.S. 133 (1973).
28. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obsts. & Gyns., 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
29. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
30. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
32. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) (5-4 summary reversal of Ninth Circuit
decision on parental consent issue); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (5-4 summary
reversal of Ninth Circuit decision invalidating statute requiring presence of physician at abortion);
Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning, 516 U.S. 474 (1996) (unanimous per curiam reversal of
injunction against state abortion funding cutoff on the ground of the order’s overbreadth).
33. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (First Amendment challenge to state
statute prohibiting protesters from approaching persons entering a clinic); Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (First Amendment challenge to judicial order imposing
separation between anti-abortion demonstrators and clinic patrons and employees); NOW, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (civil RICO action against abortion opponents).
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Affirmative action presents, in broad outline, a similar picture. The
permissibility of affirmative action was a critical issue during the late years of
the Burger Court, and the Rehnquist Court decided four such cases during its
first eight years.34 The Court was sharply divided in these cases, each of which
was decided by the narrowest margin, with some decisions upholding
affirmative action programs and others striking them down. In 1995, the Court
decided the only affirmative action case to date by the second Rehnquist
Court.35 Again, the Court was sharply divided. In a 5-4 decision, it ruled that
affirmative action programs designed to assist racial minorities are subject to a
standard of strict scrutiny. The Court declined to apply this standard to the
case at hand, however, and instead remanded to the lower courts for ultimate
disposition, with the result that the ruling had an abstract quality about it. With
that, the Court fell silent on the issue.36
There are a variety of explanations for the disappearance of affirmative
action cases from the Court’s docket, and the evidence is mixed about whether
the Court is really trying to avoid the issue.37 For whatever reasons, however,
the general picture of inactivity is clear. After a period in which the Court was
vigorously, if somewhat chaotically, engaged with the issue of affirmative
action, it entered a period in which the issue disappeared from the docket for
seven years.38
34. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149 (1987).
35. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
36. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests: Equal Protection
Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 260 (2002) (documenting divisions in
lower courts in the wake of cryptic decision in Adarand).
37. Action by the Solicitor General has been important in keeping affirmative action off the
Court’s agenda. In the Clinton years, the Solicitor General sought unsuccessfully to keep the
Court from reviewing one prominent affirmative action case, Taxman v. Board of Education, 91
F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). When the Court granted review anyway, a collection of
interest groups supporting affirmative action came up with enough money to induce the
respondent to settle her legal action, and the School Board to drop its appeal. See Linda R. Cohen
& Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 391, 399 (2000). This episode suggests that the demise of affirmative action
decisions has more to do with agenda manipulation by litigants than with the Court’s own
reluctance to rule on the issue. More recently, the second Bush Administration urged the Court,
after it had granted review for a second time in Adarand, to dismiss the case as improvidently
granted, which the Court did. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).
This suggests perhaps that the Presidents of both parties would prefer to avoid a definitive ruling
about affirmative action. Overall, the Adarand saga hardly suggests that the Court wants to keep
affirmative action off its agenda. Not only did the Court grant review in the case twice, but an
intermediate per curiam decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000), kept
the case alive by overturning a lower court’s ruling that the controversy had become moot.
38. This dry spell will evidently come to an end this Term, as the Court has agreed to resolve
a conflict in the circuits over the constitutionality of minority preference programs at public
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Cases involving government speech on religious topics reflect a somewhat
similar pattern. For a time, it appeared that the Court would disavow the threepart test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman39 and permit religious expression by
government provided it could not be said to coerce observance of religious
belief.40 These hopes, however, were thwarted in Lee v. Weisman,41 where the
Court, speaking through Justice Kennedy, reaffirmed that prayers may not be
spoken in public schools—including nondenominational prayers offered at
graduation ceremonies.
Two other Reagan-Bush appointees, Justices
O’Connor and Souter, joined the Kennedy opinion in Lee, making it unlikely
that the Court will revisit this position in the foreseeable future.42
The second Rehnquist Court has continued to be active on the
Establishment Clause front, but the most frequently litigated issues have
centered on questions of access of religious schools to government funding,
and of religious groups to government facilities. In these cases, the Rehnquist
majority has continued to push toward greater accommodation of religion in
public life.43 Meanwhile, cases involving government speech on religious
topics—probably the most explosive issue under the Establishment Clause—
have gone quietly away.
When we turn from the second Rehnquist Court’s reticence to engage with
social issues to federalism issues, a very different picture emerges. Consider
the cases presenting questions about the scope of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Important
decisions construing the scope of these powers have been rendered from timeto-time throughout the Court’s history; but, for whatever reasons, no such
decisions were handed down during the first Rehnquist Court. The second

universities. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 602 (2002); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 617
(2002).
39. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The three-part test requires that the challenged law have a secular
purpose; that its primary effect be neither to advance or inhibit religion; and that it not foster
excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
40. For example, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), a badly splintered
Court invalidated a crèche display in the stairwell of one public building, but upheld a display
with a Christmas tree and menorah outside a different building. Justice O’Connor, concurring,
declined to use the Lemon test and instead urged an endorsement standard. Id. at 624-25. The
four Justices that joined a dissenting opinion by Justice Kennedy, which pointedly criticized the
Lemon test, would have upheld both displays because they did not entail any coercion of religious
belief. Id. at 659-63.
41. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
42. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grument, 512 U.S. 687, 750-51 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing ruefully that his prediction in dissent in Lee v. Weisman that the
Lemon test would soon be discarded had been premature).
43. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Rehnquist Court has now rendered eight decisions construing the scope of
Congress’s power under these two grants.44
The emergence of these issues is not an accident. The Court moved
eagerly to put issues about federalism on its agenda. The most striking
example is Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,45 where the petition for
certiorari sought review of a decision holding that Congress has more limited
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce
Clause than under the Interstate Commerce Clause. The possibility that the
decision would be used as a vehicle to reconsider Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co.,46 which had held five years before that Congress does have power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause, was
barely mentioned in the briefs of the parties. Nevertheless, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion framed the issue broadly in a way that Union Gas was
placed squarely in issue, and the Court proceeded to overrule that decision.47
More important than the Court’s agenda is what the Court does in the cases
that appear on its agenda. The judgment here is necessarily a subjective one,
but it is my sense that the second Rehnquist Court has enunciated a larger
quotient of new doctrine in important areas of the law than did the first
Rehnquist Court. Certainly this is true in the two areas of contrasting
emphasis—social issues and federalism.
Notwithstanding its relative
preoccupation with social issues, the first Rehnquist Court did not stake out
much new ground in this area. Its leading abortion precedent, Casey,48 did not
produce an opinion for the Court, is defensive in tone, and is best reviewed as a
partial retrenchment from prior law rather than a new departure. In the
affirmative action area, the Court succeeded largely in sowing confusion. In
the privacy cases raising issues other than abortion, the Court swung back and

44. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Section 5); Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
(Commerce Clause); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (Commerce Clause); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Commerce Clause and Section 5); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Section 5); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Section 5); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(Section 5); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause).
45. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
46. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
47. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 66. Similar aggressiveness can be seen in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the decision that inaugurated a new restrictive approach to
interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause. The lower court had declared the Gun-Free
School Zones Act unconstitutional on the narrow ground that Congress had made no findings
connecting the possession of a gun near a school with interstate commerce. See United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1362-66 (5th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court granted review and affirmed
on much broader grounds, citing the absence of findings as only one element in support of its
ruling. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-66.
48. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

586

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:569

forth between intervention and deference, and engaged in an inconclusive
debate about the role of tradition in defining the scope of substantive due
process rights.49 With respect to public accommodation of religion, numerous
Justices criticized but could never muster a majority for overruling Lemon v.
Kurtzman,50 and the Court ended up reaffirming a rule of strict separation in
cases involving public expression on religious topics.
In contrast, the second Rehnquist Court has struck out boldly in its area of
preferred activity. The Court’s doctrinal innovations, primarily in the
federalism area, have resulted in an unprecedented outpouring of decisions
It has adopted a new
holding Acts of Congress unconstitutional.51
“commercial activities” limitation on the “affecting commerce” rationale for
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause,52 and a new “congruence and
proportionality” limitation on Congress’s powers under Section 5.53 The
greater capacity of the second Rehnquist Court to generate new doctrine is
especially striking in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The first Rehnquist
Court was actually fairly active in the Eleventh Amendment area,54 but its
decisions mostly relied on a clear statement rule that was, in turn, rather poorly
rationalized.55 The second Rehnquist Court has established that the Eleventh
Amendment incorporates a principle that Congress has no power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under its Article I powers,56 that the principle is
binding on state courts as well as federal courts,57 and that it applies to federal
administrative agencies as well as federal courts.58 Although the soundness of

49. Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (striking down state prison regulation that
prohibited marriages by inmates as a violation of substantive due process), with Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding against a substantive due process attack a state law
denying visitation rights to biological father of child born to woman married to another man).
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
51. See Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1974 (2001) (noting
that only 127 federal laws were struck down by the Court in the first two hundred years of its
existence—a rate of about 0.6 per year—whereas in the six years after 1995, 26 different federal
statutes were invalidated—a rate of 4.3 per year).
52. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-11, 613 (2000).
53. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
54. See cases listed infra Appendix A.
55. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 (1985). Probably the best
justification for a clear statement rule in this context is that it is necessary for the States to protect
themselves through the political process. The Court advanced this justification in the context of
statutory interpretation, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991), but did not extend this
reasoning to Eleventh Amendment decisions.
56. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
57. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
58. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
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these developments is debatable,59 there is no question that the Court has
struck out in bold new directions and has vigorously defended its vision of the
importance of state sovereign immunity in the constitutional scheme.
A further area of contrast concerns the prominence and stability of certain
voting blocs. The Rehnquist Court started out divided between five
conservatives and four liberals, and it remains divided in the same proportions
today. As many commentators have observed, however, a very high
percentage of the controversial decisions rendered by the second Rehnquist
Court are 5-4 divisions that track exactly the 5-4 conservative/liberal split.
Quantitative analysis seems to confirm this. Looking at data on all cases
decided on the merits during the second Rehnquist Court, Paul Edelman and
Jim Chen report that the conservative bloc has rendered nearly half of the
Court’s 5-4 decisions since 1994.60 The dominance of the conservative bloc is
underscored by the fact that the only other configurations of 5-4 occurring with
any frequency are those in which either Justice O’Connor or Justice Kennedy
peals off and joins the liberal foursome. In fact, putting aside the three most
frequently observed coalitions—the conservative bloc and two alliances
consisting of the liberals plus either Justice O’Connor or Justice Kennedy
defecting from the conservative bloc—no other coalition of five appears with
more than a trivial degree of frequency.61 Clearly, the second Rehnquist Court
is divided into two camps, in which two Justices (O’Connor and Kennedy) are
somewhat more weakly attached to the majority than are the other three
Members.

59. For an especially cogent critique, arguing that the Court has gone overboard on
immunity federalism at the expense of process federalism, see Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign
Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
60. Edelman & Chen, supra note 19, at 178-79.
61. Id. at 179.
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FIGURE 4
Percent distribution of 5-4 decisions by coalition
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Figure 4 above offers a different perspective on this phenomenon,
presenting data on the percentage of cases decided 5-4 for each Term of the
Rehnquist Court from 1986 to the present, and the fraction of those cases in
which the majority consists entirely of conservative Justices.62 The data reveal
that bloc voting by conservatives is not new. Significant percentages of cases
were decided by five-member conservative majorities in 1986, 1988, and 1989;
however, the frequency of 5-4 conservative blocs fluctuates widely during the
first Rehnquist Court, and, of course, because the composition of the Court was
changing during these years, these are different conservative blocs from yearto-year. In one year, 1992, there were three different combinations of 5-4
conservative blocs within a single year. Thus, the 5-4 conservative majorities
in these years do not have the same monolithic quality as the 5-4 conservative
majorities during the second Rehnquist Court. Moreover, note that the
percentage of 5-4 cases gradually increased in the late 1990s, reaching an alltime high of 31% in the 2000 Term,63 with the dominant conservative coalition
responsible for 17% of all decided cases in that year. This provides some

62. By expressing the numbers as percentages of all merits cases instead of absolute
numbers, we adjust for the declining numbers of merits cases decided over the sixteen-year
period.
63. For a complete tabulation of the percentage of 5-4 decisions up to 1990, see Robert E.
Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 1900-1990,
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 711-12 tbl.1 (1993).
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evidence that the conservative majority is, in fact, becoming stronger and is
controlling an increasing percentage of the decisions on the Court’s docket.
A final area of contrast between the first and second Rehnquist Courts
concerns the frequency with which five Justices are unable to agree on a single
rationale for the disposition of a case. Such cases usually result in the
judgment of the Court being announced by what is called a “plurality opinion,”
so we can call them plurality decisions for short. Plurality decisions are
generally thought to be undesirable because they are weak precedents. The
judgment of the Court in such a case is legally binding, but it is a precedent
only to the extent of the “narrowest” rationale advanced in support of it by one
or more Justices.64 This could be the plurality opinion, or it could be a
concurring opinion. Often it will be difficult to determine which of two or
more opinions provides the narrowest rationale supporting the judgment.
Consequently, plurality decisions frequently lead to disagreements among
lower courts and require further clarification by the Supreme Court. Not
surprisingly, they are more prone to being overruled than are other types of
precedents.65
One might think that as the frequency of 5-4 dispositions on a Court rises,
the number of plurality decisions would also rise, since both are indicative of
internal division on the Court. In fact, however, the opposite has happened on
the Rehnquist Court, as summarized in Figure 5 on the next page. The first
Rehnquist Court was much more prone to fragmenting in a way that resulted in
a plurality decision than is the second Rehnquist Court. Indeed, in the first
Rehnquist Court, over 9% of argued cases resulted in plurality decisions, and
in one year, 1988-89, seventeen cases failed to generate a majority opinion—
nearly 13% of all cases decided that year. In the second Rehnquist Court, by
contrast, plurality decisions have fallen to just 6% of decided cases, and in the
last two Terms the number of plurality opinions has fallen to very low levels.
In fact, in the 2000 Term—the year of Bush v. Gore66—the second Rehnquist
Court produced only one plurality decision, an astonishing feat given the
pressures under which the Court was operating that year. When we plot the
three-year rolling percentage of all decisions that are plurality decisions (to
smooth out the kinks), we see that the percentage does not change much up
through the 1995 Term, but it then moves down gradually, yet perceptibly,
during the later years of the second Rehnquist Court.

64. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). See Mark A. Thurmon, When the
Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42
DUKE L.J. 419 (1992).
65. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), and citing as one reason that the prior precedent was only a
plurality decision).
66. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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FIGURE 5
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If one were to pick one word to describe the second Rehnquist Court, it
might be “disciplined.” The Court is obviously very closely divided on many
issues, but it has reduced the size of its case load, avoided getting much
involved in controversial social issues, concentrated on areas where five
Justices agree on the outcome, and minimized the amount of effort wasted on
decisions that fail to generate a single majority opinion. Chief Justice
Rehnquist presides over a well-oiled machine that, without undue effort,
churns out legal doctrine he largely finds congenial.67 It is quite a contrast to
the frustrating spectacle presented by the first Rehnquist Court. It remains to
explain how it happened that the Court was transformed in this fashion,
sometime around the summer of 1994.
III. THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL: THE THOMAS-FOR-WHITE SWITCH
In order to give some structure to our search for explanations for the
differences between the first and second Rehnquist Courts, it will be useful to
draw upon some hypotheses that political scientists have developed in studying
judicial behavior. The dominant hypothesis of the political scientists, at least
until quite recently, has been what is known as the attitudinal model. This
model posits that the Justices vote in each case for the outcome that

67. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on Docket, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2001, at A1 (“In the term that marked the chief justice’s 30th anniversary on the
bench, the court moved far toward accomplishing his long-term goals . . . .”).
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corresponds with their individual policy preferences.68 By “policy
preferences,” attitudinal theorists have tended to mean political preferences in
a fairly narrow partisan sense. Thus, some Justices are said to be “liberals,”
meaning that they prefer expansive interpretations of civil rights, strict
protection of the rights of criminal defendants, and aggressive government
regulation of the economy; other Justices are said to be “conservatives,”
meaning that they favor narrow interpretations of civil rights, broad discretion
for police and prosecutors, and protections for private property rights.69
Lawyers have generally reacted with hostility to attitudinal literature,
finding that it reflects an overly-crude picture of judicial decision making.70
The critics say it caricatures the Supreme Court as nothing more than a body of
nine legislators unconstrained by the need to stand for election. Although
lawyers occasionally grouse about the Court in similar terms, they know that
this is not a complete picture of how the Court operates. For example, the
attitudinal model has no way of explaining the constraining force of the
language of authoritative texts and precedent in judicial decision making, not
to mention the importance of doctrines pertaining to jurisdiction and
justiciability.
More recent political science literature suggests, however, that the defining
feature of the attitudinal model is not the crude depiction of Justices as being
motivated solely by partisan preferences. Rather, the distinguishing feature of
the theory is the assumption that judges vote reflexively in each case; that is,
they cast their votes based solely on their individual reactions to the facts and
legal issues presented, rather than by considering, in addition, how other
judges or institutions are likely to react to the decision.71 The key premise of
the attitudinal model, in other words, is that judges behave nonstrategically.
Once we see that the attitudinal model is, at its core, a hypothesis of
reflexive behavior, then the question of how we depict the “policy preferences”
of the Justices becomes a contingent feature of the model that can vary in
accordance with the demands of the empirics. The traditional model of the
attitudinalists, in which every Justice is either a monolithic “liberal” or a
“conservative” concerned only with influencing public policy, is simply one,
highly reductionistic version of “policy preferences.”
This kind of

68. See BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 13, at 60; Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the
Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992).
69. See, e.g., BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 13, at 89 n.1.
70. In fact, the originators of the attitudinal theory drew upon behaviorist psychology,
suggesting that judicial behavior corresponds to a psychological model of stimulus and response.
The facts of a case are like a “stimulus” to the Justice, and the vote of the Justice in the case is the
“response.” Show a Justice a brief that indicates the case involves a labor controversy, and the
Justice will vote reflexively for the union side or the management side, depending on whether he
or she is “liberal” or “conservative.”
71. See Cross, supra note 12.
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reductionism can be useful in certain kinds of studies, for example, ones that
look at very large numbers of cases presenting particular issues like abortion or
the death penalty over a long period of time. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that a more nuanced conception of “policy preferences” is
inconsistent with the attitudinal theory. In particular, there is no reason why
one cannot include in the definition of policy preferences a Justice’s judicial
philosophy, including such variables as whether the Justice inclines more
toward interpreting the Constitution according to its original or its evolved
meaning, or inclines more or less toward following precedent.72 Adding these
more lawyer-like attributes into the mix obviously makes life more
complicated for the number-crunchers, so there may be reasons to reject these
refinements as part of a particular study; however, there is nothing inherent in
the attitudinal model that compels us to adopt a cartoon-like conception of
judging, provided we are willing to suffer the consequences of a more
complicated set of independent variables.
Once we understand the attitudinal model to be about reflexive, that is,
nonstrategic, behavior, we can also see that there is nothing “tautological”
about seeking to ascertain a Justice’s preferences by examining his or her
voting record and opinions as a Justice, as the traditional attitudinalists have
sometimes suggested.73 Rather, we can view each decision of the Court as a
little window that allows us to peer into the revealed beliefs and attitudes of the
Justices. Armed with this information, we can make generalizations about
those beliefs and attitudes, and use these generalizations to predict how each
Justice is likely to vote and write in future cases that present similar issues.74
The key to the attitudinal model is not the source of our information about
judicial preferences; rather, it is the hypothesis that the Justices act reflexively
in seeking to implement those preferences.
From the attitudinal perspective, the decisive variable in explaining the
behavior of the Court is composition of the Court, and, in particular, the policy
preferences of the majority bloc of Justices. If the Rehnquist Court has
changed its behavior during the sixteen years of its existence, the attitudinal
model would suggest that the place to look in explaining this change is to
consider whether there has been a change in the policy preferences (understood
for my purposes to include judicial philosophy) of the members of the majority
bloc.
72. For an insightful discussion contrasting judicial preferences and judicial judgments, see
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 85-89
(1986).
73. Cf. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 11 (also insisting that the goals of Justices
must be specified independently of their behavior).
74. For an example of a recent study that proceeds this way (more systematically than I do)
in developing a measure of Justices’ preferences, see Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated
Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 559-60 (1999).
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The change of greatest potential relevance was the replacement of Justice
White by Justice Thomas, which was completed when White retired in 1993.75
Justice White is often described as an inscrutable figure who approached each
case on its own terms without any overriding philosophy of government or
theory of the judicial role; however, I think this is incorrect. The view of
White as lacking any theoretical commitments is primarily a reflection of his
unwillingness to give speeches or write law review articles, and of the terse,
doggedly legalistic style of his opinions.76 However, when one steps back and
views the overall sweep of his judicial career, a reasonably clear pattern
emerges.
White was a New Deal liberal who basically shared the
jurisprudence (but not the rhetorical style) of Felix Frankfurter.77 Thus, he
believed that the Constitution should be interpreted flexibly in order to allow
Congress to create new types of administrative structures in response to
unanticipated economic and social problems.78 He believed that it was the
mission of the federal government to redress problems of economic inequality,
as by encouraging the use of collective bargaining and restricting the abuse of

75. I put aside the replacement of Justice Powell by Justice Kennedy in 1987. This is not
because there are no intriguing contrasts between these two men. Rather, it is because the
Kennedy-for-Powell switch occurred after just one year of the Rehnquist Court, and, thus, for
practical purposes Justice Kennedy has been a fixture of the Court throughout its duration.
Certainly, one cannot attribute any of the differences between the first Rehnquist Court and
second Rehnquist Court to the substitution of Kennedy for Powell.
76. My characterization of White draws upon the fine biography by Dennis Hutchinson. See
DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE (1998). On White’s lack
of extrajudicial writings, see id. at 330 (noting that at the time of White’s nomination to the
Supreme Court “[t]here was no written record to review, since White had given only six speeches
as deputy attorney general and none touched on judicial review or allied issues”). On White’s
opinion-writing style, see, for example, id. at 356 (“[M]ost of White’s opinions are precise,
methodical, and impatient to finish the job. . . . There are few lapidary lines or memorable turns
of phrase.”); id. at 363 (“White wrote opinions that were often densely presented and no better
than implicit about their theoretical premises.”).
77. Hutchinson resists the notion that White was a New Dealer, although he admits that there
were “chords” from the New Deal “that resonate insistently throughout White’s judicial career—
primarily his unswerving nationalism and his belief that judges should be wary of making social
policy, particularly in comprehensive terms, without clear congressional authorization.” Id. at
446-47.
78. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (defending
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as a novel solution to budgetary issues); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (defending constitutionality of legislative veto); N.
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 94 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)
(supporting Congress’s power to create special bankruptcy courts); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
258 (1976) (White, J., dissenting in part) (defending the “undoubted power of Congress to
vindicate the strong public interest” in fair elections through creation of novel Commission
formed of officers appointed by both executive and legislative branches).
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private monopoly power.79 Moreover, he supported efforts by the government
to end segregated schooling and other forms of invidious discrimination
against minorities.80 He had little interest or patience, however, with the idea
that an unelected judiciary should identify new rights that have not been
marked as such by established democratic processes, whether it be new
criminal procedural rights, First Amendment rights, or privacy rights.81 This
was to invite the sort of judicial meddling with majoritarian politics that had
threatened to undo the New Deal in the mid-1930s.82
Justice White remained steadfast in these views, even as the issues of the
1960s gave way to those of the 1970s and 1980s.83 Under the new conception
of judicial politics that eventually emerged during the Burger Court years, a
“liberal” came to be defined as a judge who participates enthusiastically in the
creation of new rights, whether it be abortion rights, protections for gays and
lesbians, affirmative action remedies, or procedural protections for death
penalty defendants, without regard to whether these interests have been marked
off as warranting heightened protection by legislative majorities or
supermajorities. A “conservative” is a judge who opposes the recognition of
79. See, e.g., Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 490
(1989) (White, J.) (vacating injunction against RR strike); Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc.
v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982) (White, J.) (invalidating employers’ attempt to withdraw from
collective bargaining process); Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (White,
J.) (condemning price discrimination despite competitors’ increase in profits); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (White, J.) (holding union minimum wage platform
exempt from Sherman Act claims).
80. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (White, J.) (upholding novel
desegregation decree that required local authorities to raise taxes to improve quality of schools);
N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (White, J.) (upholding ordinance
prohibiting discrimination by private clubs); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (White, J.)
(invalidating state referendum as sanctioning private discrimination in housing). Cf. Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (White, J.) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act in such a way as to narrow application of the disparate impact test).
81. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J.) (stating that the level of
protection afforded to private sexual conduct should properly be determined by state legislative
decisions rather than through a judicially constructed “fundamental” right at odds with history
and tradition); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (White, J.) (maintaining that the basis
for a “newsman’s privilege” from subpoena rests on legislative determinations of fact rather than
judicial interpretation of the First Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966)
(White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has not discovered or found the law in making today’s
decision, nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to make new law
and new public policy . . . .”).
82. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (White, J.) (“The Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully
demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930’s. . . .”).
83. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 76, at 445 (noting the essential continuity in White’s
positions while on the Court).
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these sorts of new rights. Some Justices, such as Brennan and Marshall, and in
their later years Blackmun and Stevens, made successful adjustments to the
new conception of progressive judging. White, however, did not. Thus, White
came to be labeled a conservative, almost exclusively because of his stance on
social issues, which, in turn, was a product of his philosophy of judicial
restraint. The fact that White continued to support a powerful federal
government, legal protection of labor unions, tough enforcement of antitrust
laws, and vigorous implementation of desegregation decrees was deemed
inconsequential under the popular mode of classification that emerged during
this time.
In contrast to White, Clarence Thomas can only be described as
conservative through-and-through. Thomas was raised by his grandparents in
a strict religious household that instilled respect for traditional virtues of hard
work and obedience to authority.84 No doubt the roots of his conservatism can
be found in this background; however, Thomas’s behavior as a Justice can be
fully understood only against the backdrop of his extraordinary confirmation
experience. Before his nomination, Thomas had drawn attention to himself
while serving as Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for
his public denunciation of affirmative action and intimations of opposition to
Roe v. Wade.85 At his confirmation hearings, however, Thomas sought to
avoid any scrutiny of his views on controversial subjects by claiming that he
did not have any; for example, he did not want to comment on Roe.86 Angered
by what they regarded as dissembling, the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary
Committee retaliated by bringing forth a surprise witness—Anita Hill—who
accused Thomas of engaging in inappropriate sexual advances when she was
his subordinate at the EEOC.87 Thomas made a blanket denial of the charges
and accused the accusers of trying to engage in a “high-tech lynching for
uppity-blacks.”88 After opinion polls showed that slightly more viewers of this
televised spectacle believed Thomas than Hill, he was confirmed by a vote of
52-48, the narrowest margin of confirmation in Supreme Court history.
The searing confirmation experience reportedly left Thomas deeply
embittered,89 and seems to have steeled his resolve to embrace only the most
outspoken conservative views as a kind of revenge against his tormentors.
Thus, for example, it has been reported that Thomas surrounds himself with
84. See generally JOHN GREENYA, SILENT JUSTICE: THE CLARENCE THOMAS STORY
(2001).
85. See EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 449-50 (1998).
86. 1 The Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.
127 (1991) [hereinafter Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas].
87. GREENYA, supra note 84, at 200.
88. See 4 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas, supra note 86, at 157.
89. ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 469-70 (2001).
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“uniformly archconservative clerks”90 whom he encourages to draft opinions
“remarkably provocative in result.”91
Whatever the truth of these accounts, Thomas’s opinions have been
consistently distinguished by a kind of ultra quality since joining the Court.
His most revealing statements appear in concurring and dissenting opinions,
where he has embraced a variety of viewpoints—at times libertarian, at times
originalist, at times federalist—but always at the far right end of the judicial
spectrum. Thus, Thomas has authored several separate opinions which come
closer to endorsing a purely originalist philosophy for interpreting the
Constitution than has any other Justice in the Court’s long history.92 He has
decried the continued use of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine on the
ground that it has no basis in constitutional text and unduly interferes with the
states.93 He has developed a compact theory of federalism based on the idea
that the Constitution was ratified by the states as opposed to the people.94
Moreover, he has adopted narrow interpretations of federal statutes in order to
preserve traditional state prerogatives.95
We also have more direct evidence of the differing preferences of Justices
White and Thomas. These two men served together on the Court for most of
two Terms. Consequently, we can look at their voting records during these
two Terms for clues about how they compare in their response to a range of
issues. Overall, we find that White and Thomas voted together in about 67%
of the cases decided in these two Terms.96 This is significantly higher than the
rate of agreement between Thomas and either Justice Stevens or Justice
Blackmun,97 but it is significantly lower than the rate of agreement between
90. LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 457.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(urging return to original understanding of the Commerce Clause); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
521 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of adopting interpretation of the Privilege
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contrary to the original understanding);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging return to
original understanding of the Commerce Clause); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995)
(Thomas, J.) (opinion for the Court holding that common law knock-and-announce rule was
incorporated into the Fourth Amendment).
93. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
94. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
95. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 402 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting in part) (urging narrow interpretation of Telecommunications Act of 1996 in order to
preserve traditional state authority over regulation of intrastate telephone service).
96. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 379 tbl.I(B)
(1992); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 373 tbl.I(B)
(1993).
97. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 96 (approximate rates of
agreement for Thomas and Stevens equal 41% (1991) and for Thomas and Blackmun equal 42%
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Thomas and either Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Scalia.98 Thus, based on
his first two Terms on the Court, Thomas would appear to be aligned much
more closely with the conservative jurisprudence of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia than with the type of conservatism associated with Justice
White.
When we take a closer look at the cases in which White and Thomas
disagreed during those two Terms, we find further confirmation that they are
conservatives of a different stripe. For example, one can detect differing
attitudes toward federal regulation of economic activity in Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB.99 Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court, overturning a Labor
Board ruling about when union organizers who are not members of the
workforce can enter an employer’s private property. Justice White, dissenting,
would have deferred to the Board’s ruling. CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
Easterwood100 suggests differing attitudes toward federal preemption of state
law. This time Justice White wrote for the Court, finding that a train operated
within speed limits set by a Department of Transportation regulation is
immune from state-law tort suits predicated on negligence. Justice Thomas
dissented in part, arguing that the federal rule was a regulatory floor, not a
source of immunity from state tort liability. Furthermore, Helling v.
McKinney101 reveals different attitudes toward sources of constitutional
interpretation. Writing for the Court, Justice White concluded that the Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not foreclose a claim by a prisoner that
being forced to share a cell with a chain smoker is cruel and unusual
punishment. Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the Eighth
Amendment as originally understood applied only to the terms of punishments
imposed at sentencing, not to conditions of confinement that arise while a
sentence is being carried out. Thus, in his view (joined only by Justice Scalia),
the prisoner’s claim was not covered by the Eighth Amendment at all.
Given their distinctive judicial philosophies, one would expect to find
significant areas of overlap in the substantive positions of Justices White and
Thomas, but also areas where they would take sharply divergent positions.
The areas where one would expect to find overlap include most of what I have

(1991)); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 96 (approximate rates of
agreement for Thomas and Stevens equal 46% (1992) and for Thomas and Blackmun equal 51%
(1992)).
98. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 96 (approximate rates of
agreement for Thomas and Rehnquist equal 80% (1991) and for Thomas and Scalia equal 86%
(1991)); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 96 (approximate rates of
agreement for Thomas and Rehnquist equal 83% (1992) and for Thomas and Scalia equal 86%
(1992)).
99. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
100. 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
101. 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
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previously identified as the “social issues” basket: abortion, other privacy
rights, affirmative action, and religious accommodation. Although White and
Thomas might reach these results for different reasons, they would generally
end up at the same place. With respect to social issues, therefore, the Thomasfor-White switch would not be expected to induce any change in the overall
doctrine of the Rehnquist Court.
There are, however, at least three areas where the preferences of Justices
White and Thomas diverge fairly sharply and, hence, where the attitudinal
theory would lead us to expect a potential shift in outcomes. Probably the
most dramatic divergence is constitutional federalism, where Justice White’s
strong nationalism and deference to Congress contrasts sharply with Justice
Thomas’s originalism and commitment to state autonomy. Here, there is no
doubt that the White-to-Thomas transfer has had major consequences. Most of
the Court’s innovations in the area of federalism since 1993 have been decided
by a margin of 5-4. In nearly all these cases, Justice Thomas has supplied the
critical fifth vote.102 Nor can there be much doubt that if Justice White had
remained on the Court, he would have disavowed these innovations. With
respect to claims grounded in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments we can be
quite confident about this. Justice White dissented from the Tenth Amendment
portion of the Court’s 1992 decision in New York v. United States.103 Thus, it
seems likely that if White were still on the Court in 1997, the background
check requirement of the gun control law known as the Brady Bill would have
been upheld in Printz v. United States,104 rather than invalidated 5-4. With
respect to the Eleventh Amendment, White authored a separate opinion in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.105 in 1989, creating a 5-4 majority for the
proposition that Congress has the power, under Article I of the Constitution, to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.106 After

102. Justice Thomas has supplied the fifth vote in thirteen major 5-4 federalism decisions:
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Raygor v. Regents of the
Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses. Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
103. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
104. Printz, 521 U.S. at 898.
105. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
106. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I agree with the
conclusion reached by Justice Brennan in Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority
under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not
agree with much of his reasoning.”).
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White retired, the Court in Seminole Tribe,107 overruled Union Gas and held 54 that Congress does not have power under Article I to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
A second area of potentially significant contrast is the First Amendment.
Justice White was highly skeptical about claims for novel forms of protection
under the Free Speech and Press Clauses of the Constitution. He authored a
number of important opinions rejecting claims of special privileges for the
press and construing important First Amendment doctrines narrowly.108
Justice Thomas, in contrast, has often embraced a libertarian view of the First
Amendment and, in select areas, has advocated greater protection for free
speech rights than is recognized under current doctrine.109
Although we can identify individual First Amendment cases where the
replacement of Justice White by Justice Thomas may have affected the
outcomes reached by the Court, 110 they are few in number relative to the total
number of First Amendment cases decided by the Court since 1994. In most
First Amendment cases, Justice Thomas’s vote either has not been critical in
making a majority or has been cast in dissent. There are various reasons for
this. In some areas, such as commercial speech, enthusiasm for the pro-speech
position often includes Justices on both sides of the ideological divide,
resulting in decisions by margins larger than 5-4.111 In other areas, such as
providing constitutional protection for campaign finance contributions or for
anti-abortion demonstrators, either Justice O’Connor or Chief Justice
Rehnquist, or both, has bailed out from the pro-speech position, leaving

107. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. 44.
108. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (White, J.); Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (White, J.); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)
(White, J.); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (White, J.).
109. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1509 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (reiterating his view that the Central Hudson test for evaluating commercial speech
restrictions should be abandoned in favor of granting full protection to commercial speech unless
it promotes an illegal product or is false); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that campaign contributions are entitled to full First
Amendment protection); cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (Thomas, J., plurality
opinion) (refusing to invalidate federal regulations designed to restrict access of juveniles to
sexually explicit speech on the internet).
110. See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (invalidating 5-4 a Minnesota
rule prohibiting candidates for elected judicial offices from commenting on issues related to
controversies likely to come before the court); Thompson, 122 S. Ct. 1497 (striking down 5-4 a
federal statute prohibiting advertising by individual pharmacies that compound drugs in a manner
not determined by the FDA to be safe and effective); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000) (overturning 5-4 as an infringement on First Amendment freedom of expressive
association a New Jersey decision extending a state antidiscrimination law to an openly gay Scout
leader).
111. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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Thomas in the minority.112 Probably the most important reason, however, is
that Justice Thomas’s libertarian view of the First Amendment is highly
selective. He believes in strong, virtually absolute, protection for commercial
speech and campaign finance contributions,113 but he is willing to accept
extensive government regulation of sexually explicit speech, legal advocacy
for the poor, and subsidies of the arts.114 Thus, at least part of the time—when
the speech claim involves disfavored forms of expression—his views do not
diverge from those of the general First Amendment skeptic, Justice White.
Separation of powers is another area where the transition from White to
Thomas could, in theory, make a difference. Justice White was notorious for
his defense of functionalism and deference to congressional experimentation in
separation of powers cases.115 Thomas appears to be drawn to a more
formalist and originalist approach to separation of powers issues.116 Here,
however, we find no case in which Justice Thomas has cast a critical vote
producing an outcome that would diverge from those that would be reached if
Justice White were still around. The simple explanation seems to be that,
although the appointment of Justice Thomas gave Justice Scalia a second vote
in support of a strict, formalist approach to separation-of-powers controversies,
this increased the number of Justices committed to such an approach from one
to two. The lack of any broad-scale support for formalism can be seen most
clearly in cases involving standing-to-sue, the most frequently litigated
separation of powers question. Although Justice Scalia made some headway in
support of tightening constitutional limits on standing late in the first
Rehnquist Court, it appears, in retrospect, that this was largely a temporary
phenomenon created by the Chief Justice’s willingness to assign opinions to

112. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (O’Connor,
J., joining Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., to uphold limitation on coordinated campaign
spending); Nixon, 528 U.S. 377 (Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, Souter, &
Breyer, JJ.); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg,
& Breyer, JJ., join Stevens, J., in upholding speech restriction on abortion clinic protestors).
113. See cases cited supra note 109.
114. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 564 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting facial attack
on Child Online Protection Act); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001)
(Thomas, J., joining dissent from judgment striking down limits on types of litigation that can be
undertaken pursuant to Legal Services grants); NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590 (1998)
(Thomas, J., joining Scalia concurrence denying that First Amendment provides a basis for
challenging criteria for distributing arts grants).
115. See cases cited supra note 78.
116. The clearest manifestation of Justice Thomas’s commitment to formalism in separation
of power is Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), where he
joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court rejecting a nondelegation challenge to the Clean Air
Act, but filed a concurring opinion suggesting that he might vote otherwise in a future challenge
to such a statute that argued more broadly that Congress had impermissibly transferred the
“legislative power” to an agency.
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Justice Scalia in this area at that time.117 More recently, standing rules have
been relaxed again as the conservative majority has narrowed and assignments
have been passed around to other Justices, often with Scalia and Thomas in
dissent.118
All-in-all, the attitudinal model, and more particularly the substitution of
Thomas for White, does a good job in explaining one critical difference
between the first and second Rehnquist Courts: it changed the balance of
power on the Court on federalism issues, tipping from 5-4 in support of the
traditional New Deal conception to 5-4 in support of a revisionist, states’ rights
conception. Thus, the attitudinal model can explain, in a parsimonious and
convincing fashion, the signature jurisprudential development of the last eight
years.
When we consider the matter more closely, however, it becomes clear that
the attitudinal model only gets us so far. In particular, it accounts for only one
of the five votes in the post-1994 federalism coalition. Moreover, because
both Justices White and Thomas cast conservative votes in cases presenting
social issues, it does not account for the decline in emphasis on social issues.
Nor does it explain the paucity of doctrinal innovations in cases involving
social issues during the first Rehnquist Court, in contrast to the stream of
substantive innovations on federalism during the second Rehnquist Court. Nor
can the model account for the collapse in the size of the Court’s docket, the
increased willingness to render controversial rulings by 5-4 margins, or the
reduced number of plurality decisions. If we want an explanation for these
other elements that distinguish the second Rehnquist Court from the first, we
will have to turn to other hypotheses about judicial behavior.
IV. THE INTERNAL STRATEGIC ACTOR MODEL: JUSTICE SCALIA AND STATES’
RIGHTS
In recent years, political scientists have been intrigued by the idea of
displacing, or at least supplementing, the simple attitudinal model with more
complex models that hypothesize that judges act strategically. Like the
attitudinal model, these strategic models begin by positing that Justices seek to
maximize their personal policy preferences. Unlike the attitudinal model,
however, the strategic models do not assume that judges vote reflexively in
each case for the outcome that corresponds most closely with their preferences.
Instead, they act interdependently, taking into account the views of other actors
whose behavior is relevant to whether they will succeed in implementing their

117. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Scalia, J.); Lujan v. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (Scalia, J.).
118. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.); Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 403
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.).
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preferences. As Epstein and Knight put it, “To say that a justice acts
strategically is to say that she realizes that her success or failure depends on the
preferences of other actors and the actions she expects them to take, not just on
her own preferences and actions.”119
Broadly speaking, political scientists have identified two types of reasons
why Justices might act strategically.120 One reason is that it takes a majority of
sitting Justices to enshrine a particular position as precedent. Justices will thus
sometimes adopt positions that do not reflect their sincere judgment of the best
outcome in order to secure the outcome that is in their view the best that can be
attained under the circumstances, given the positions of the other Justices. I
will call the model of judicial behavior that focuses on this type of strategic
consideration the “internal strategic actor” model. Another reason why judges
might behave strategically is because of apprehensions about how other
political institutions—such as Congress, the executive, or the states—might
react to their decision, or how the public might react. I will call this model of
judging the “external strategic actor” model and take up its implications in Part
V.
Strategic behavior is not necessarily insincere behavior. For example, it
may happen that what a judge sincerely wants is what the judge perceives other
relevant actors also want. In this situation, there is no incompatibility between
a judge acting on his or her sincere preferences and behaving strategically.121
Political scientists, however, have argued that judges also act strategically in
the sense that they act “insincerely” in order to realize their preferences.122 In
other words, judges sometimes censure the impulse to embrace the outcome
they prefer most and, instead, support outcomes they regard as less desirable or
second best because of their perceptions of the values embraced by other actors
who have the power to block the realization of the judge’s first preference.
The line between sincere and insincere judicial behavior is often hard to
determine, especially if we continue to follow the suggestion set forth in Part
III that we broaden the definition of judicial “preferences” to include judicial
philosophy. Multi-member courts, by their very nature, require judges to
temper or compromise their individual preferences in order to produce
majority rulings. As Justice Frankfurter once observed, “When you have to
have at least five people to agree on something, they can’t have that
comprehensive completeness of candor which is open to a single man, giving

119. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 12.
120. See id. at 12-17.
121. See Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An
Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 397 n.8 (2002); see also Caldeira et al., supra
note 74, at 550-51.
122. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2302 (1999).
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his own reasons untrammeled by what anybody else may do or not do . . . .”123
It is not clear that this kind of temporizing of views to achieve collegial unity
should be called insincere behavior because it is not clear that it reflects a
deliberate suppression of a judge’s true preferences. Surely one of the
“preferences” held by judges sitting on a collegial court is the desire that the
court produce majority rulings. Thus, when a collegial judge trims back on the
“untrammeled” views he or she would espouse if sitting as a single judge, one
can say that the judge simply is weighing the sincere desire for clear majority
rulings more highly than the sincere desire to prevail on the issue at hand, with
the result that the temporizing behavior is totally sincere.124 Once we
recognize this complexity, however, the line between sincere temporizing to
achieve “collegial unity” and insincere dissembling to manipulate outcomes is
often difficult to identify, especially for outside observers. I will return to this
problem in the conclusion to this Part.
An example of insincere strategic behavior, which has taken on a kind of
canonical status in the literature, is Lee Epstein and Jack Knight’s account of
Craig v. Boren,125 a leading gender discrimination precedent of the Burger
Court. By examining the docket sheets and memorandums in the case, as
reflected in the files of several former Justices, Epstein and Knight concluded
that the Court was essentially divided into three factions: first, a liberal faction,
led by Justice Brennan, that preferred to adopt a rule that would subject gender
discrimination to a standard of strict scrutiny; second, a moderate faction, led
by Justice Powell, that preferred a standard of intermediate scrutiny; and third,
a conservative faction, led by Justice Rehnquist, that preferred a rational basis
standard of scrutiny. Epstein and Knight showed that Justice Brennan, who
assigned the case to himself as the senior Justice in the majority, decided to
draft an opinion that endorsed intermediate scrutiny, his second preference,
rather than strict scrutiny, his first preference. They suggested that he did so
because he calculated that if he wrote an opinion urging strict scrutiny, the
result might have been that five Justices would have joined another opinion
applying rational basis scrutiny, his least preferred outcome.126 Thus,
Brennan’s opinion did not reflect a mere desire to achieve collegial unity;
rather, it was designed to forestall an outcome that he feared and wished to
avoid.

123. FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 298 (1960).
124. In other words, in looking for insincere behavior in a judge what we are looking for is
“behavior that transgresses both her own convictions per se, and her convictions as appropriately
modified to respond to the pressures of collegial unity and sound collegial outcome.” Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81
CAL. L. REV. 1, 53 (1993).
125. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
126. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 13.
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In this section, I consider the possibility that the reorientation of the
Rehnquist Court in the mid-1990s can be explained by strategic behavior of the
internal actor variety. To date, accounts of strategic behavior of the internal
actor variety have largely focused on the behavior of an individual Justice in a
single case, such as Justice Brennan’s strategizing in Craig v. Boren. The
hypothesis I consider also focuses on a single individual—Justice Scalia—but
posits strategic behavior on a scale that dwarfs anything considered by political
scientists up to this point. I will suggest that Justice Scalia has behaved
strategically in seeking to influence the entire course of the Rehnquist Court
over the last eight years.
A.

Scalia’s Choice

When Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986, he had an extraordinarily
ambitious agenda that was in part substantive and in part methodological. In
terms of substantive outcomes, he wanted to overturn Roe v. Wade,127 end
affirmative action, develop a new policy of public accommodation toward
religion, establish the principle of the unitary executive in separation of
powers, and strengthen constitutional protection for private property.
However, his agenda was also, to a degree very unusual among Justices,
methodological. He wanted to create a jurisprudence that was grounded in the
public meaning of texts rather than legislative intent, which would require
judges systematically to accept executive interpretations of ambiguous statutes,
and which would be oriented toward the articulation of clear rules rather than
multi-prong lists of factors or balancing tests.128 One item that notably was not
on the agenda, however, was greater devolution of power to the states.
During the first Rehnquist Court, Justice Scalia had every reason to persist
in vigorously pursuing both his substantive and methodological agendas.
Indeed, after only a few years, he began to achieve a significant degree of
success in moving the Court toward his methodological views. Although there
was no definitive capitulation by the other Justices, opinions for the Supreme
Court—and, to a degree by emulation, opinions by courts throughout the
country—began to reduce their reliance on legislative history, to take agency
views more seriously, and to eschew the creation of new formulaic multipart
tests. Progress on the substantive front, however, proved more elusive. The
Court always seemed to fall one vote short of overturning precedents like Roe

127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128. We know all of this because he has published books and articles espousing each of these
positions. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) (attacking the use of
legislative history in the interpretation of statutes); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989) (defending mandatory judicial
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (advocating a jurisprudence of rules).
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and Lemon v. Kurtzman.129 Moreover, Justice Scalia’s views on affirmative
action received a severe blow in Metro Broadcasting,130 as did his views on
separation of powers in Morrison v. Olson.131
As the new decade of the 1990s dawned, however, there was reason to
believe that the tide would soon turn. Indeed, for roughly a three-year period
toward the end of the first Rehnquist Court—from October 1990 to the
summer of 1993—the conservatives reasonably could imagine that they were
on the threshold of supermajority status within the Court. Brennan’s
replacement by Souter in the summer of 1990 theoretically gave the
conservatives a 6-3 margin. We now know that this was illusory because
Souter either was, or decided to become, a member of the liberal faction;
however, the other conservative Justices might well have imagined they were
more powerful than they had been in 1986. In 1991, this became a reality, as
Thurgood Marshall stepped down and was replaced by Clarence Thomas.
Thomas soon proved to be a staunch conservative. For roughly a two year
period thereafter—from October 1991 to the summer of 1993—the
conservatives really did enjoy a 6-3 margin on the Court.
The fact that the conservatives either were or imagined that they were
becoming an increasingly dominant faction would have been an extremely
important datum for an internally-oriented strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s
position, and it would have led such a Justice to anticipate that success in
achieving his ends was just around the corner. This sense of expectation for
the future is arguably captured by a line in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion
in a 1990 abortion case: “The Court should end its disruptive intrusion into this
field as soon as possible.”132
By 1993, however, Justice Scalia’s substantive agenda lay in shambles.
The basic problem was the unwillingness of three Republican appointees—
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter—to disrupt the constitutional status
quo. Most dramatically, these three had colluded together in 1992 to produce
the reaffirmation of the “essential holding” of Roe in Casey,133 citing concerns
about stare decisis and the Court’s legitimacy.134 With White’s departure in
1993, the prospect for eliminating Roe and other manifestations of modern
substantive due process were gone for the indefinite future. Similarly, the
cause of religious accommodation had been dealt a severe blow by Lee v.
129. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
130. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding minority preference policies
in awarding broadcasting licenses).
131. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the Independent Counsel Act against separation of
powers objections).
132. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 521 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
133. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
134. On the secretiveness of the Casey trio, see LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 472.
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Weisman,135 decided the same term as Casey. There, the same three
Republican appointees who defected in Casey reaffirmed the rule against
prayer in public school settings; worse, after previously having made
sympathetic noises, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor got cold feet and
appeared to disavow Justice Scalia’s drive to overturn Lemon.136 With respect
to affirmative action and other issues involving race, such as redistricting and
busing, the situation was less dire, but Justice Souter was likely to side with the
liberals on these issues, and Justice O’Connor had signaled her unwillingness
to adopt a clear rule prohibiting preferential racial classifications.137 So the
best that probably could be achieved going forward was endless hairsplitting
distinctions in plurality decisions. Separation of powers was the most
distressing of all. Here, Justice Scalia had become completely isolated in cases
like Morrison138 and Mistretta.139 To cap it all off, a Democratic President was
newly installed in the White House, and, thus, there was no prospect for the
foreseeable future of gaining ground in any of these areas through new
appointments to the Court.
In this situation, a strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s position would have
perceived essentially two choices. One was to persist in the substantive agenda
he had been seeking since his appointment to the Court and become, in effect,
a chronic dissenter. The other was quietly to abandon, or at least shelve, this
substantive agenda, and seek out some other agenda as to which he could find
common ground with four other Justices. A rational actor seeking to maximize
his policy preferences would have perceived a number of advantages to
pursuing the latter, that is, the strategic, course.
1. Influencing majority opinions. It is always better to be part of a winning
coalition than to lose. Being a member of a winning coalition creates
opportunities to frame legal doctrine that disappear when one loses. In Justice
Scalia’s case, this consideration should loom especially large given his
strongly held methodological preferences. If part of the majority, for instance,
Justice Scalia could continue to work to extirpate balancing tests from
constitutional law, either by writing majority opinions that disavow such an
approach or by asking that such tests be eliminated as a condition of joining
other majority opinions. Moreover, if and when he was assigned periodically

135. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
136. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
137. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality);
cf. id. at 735-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
138. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the Independent Counsel Act against
separation of powers objections); id. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding delegation of power to U.S.
Sentencing Commission to adopt binding guidelines for maximum and minimum federal criminal
sentences); id. at 413-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to write majority opinions, he could use the occasion to plant seeds for future
developments in other areas he regards as being more important.
2. Potential reciprocity. Providing a key vote to make a majority for other
Justices could potentially yield future benefits in terms of reciprocity. It is
often observed—correctly—that logrolling is prohibited under the decisional
norms of the Supreme Court,140 but it is impossible to erase considerations of
good will entirely from human behavior. If someone with whom you interact
frequently does a number of favors for you, the expectation is that these favors
will, in some fashion, be returned. If Justice Scalia had learned anything from
the abortion cases, it should have been that trying to browbeat other Justices
through invective and sarcasm does not work. Perhaps cooperating politely as
part of a functioning majority on issues of lower public visibility would lead to
better relations, in particular with Justice O’Connor, which might bear fruit
down the road if she were willing to reciprocate.
3. Please the Chief. Cooperating with the other four conservatives could
win brownie points with the Chief Justice. There is evidence that the Chief
Justice did not always favor Justice Scalia with the best opinion writing
assignments during the first Rehnquist Court.141 There are a number of
possible reasons for this, one of them, no doubt, being that Scalia’s persistent
efforts to enshrine his methodological preferences in the law often ended up
costing him votes, sometimes even majority support. The Chief Justice was
probably baffled by Justice Scalia’s strongly-held methodological
commitments, and often irritated by his verbal pyrotechnics and the hard
feelings they engendered with other Justices. Adopting a policy of quietly
joining the other conservatives to form a majority in other areas—especially
ones near and dear to the Chief’s heart—might induce Rehnquist to look more
kindly upon Scalia when opinion assignments came up in other areas where he
cared more deeply about the outcome.
4. The legacy. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for an ambitious
Justice like Scalia, it is important to be able to say that one’s tenure on the
Court has made a difference in the course of history. By 1993, it appeared that
persevering in his original substantive agenda might produce a lot of sound and
fury signifying nothing. Better to leave some kind of legacy than none at all.
Suppose, to continue to spell out the hypothesis, that Justice Scalia had
engaged in the foregoing reasoning process or something like it in the mid1990s, and, to reverse the old jingle, that he concluded it is “better to switch
140. See Caminker, supra note 122, at 2333.
141. See Albert P. Melone & Thea F. Rubin, Justice Antonin Scalia: A First Year Freshman
Effect?, 72 JUDICATURE 98, 99-100 (1988) (reporting that Scalia’s Majority Opinion Assignment
Ratio (OAR) was the lowest of any member of the court in the 1986 term despite a plethora of
concurring and dissenting opinions); Sue Davis, Power on the Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
Opinion Assignments, 74 JUDICATURE 66, 70 (1990) (calculating that Scalia’s 12.12 OAR in
“important cases” falls well below those of White and Powell).
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than to fight.” What course of conduct would he have pursued? The obvious
strategy would have had two sides: an affirmative side and a negative side.
On the affirmative side, a strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s position would
have sought to identify areas of potential agreement among the five remaining
conservatives. Constitutional federalism would seem to be a prime candidate.
Justice O’Connor, born and raised in Arizona and a former state legislator, had
signaled repeatedly that she cares deeply about such issues.142 Justice
Kennedy, another westerner who was the son of a state lobbyist and a former
state lobbyist himself, also seemed committed to states’ rights.143 The Chief
Justice’s support was a foregone conclusion.144 Justice Thomas, lastly,
appeared willing to support any conservative position that was anathema to the
Democratic left. Other possibilities for cooperation included racial preferences
other than affirmative action programs (such as the creation of majorityminority districts in voting rights cases), cases involving viewpoint-neutral
subsidies that include religious schools and organizations, and the Takings
Clause. Having identified these areas of potential agreement, the strategic
Justice would work to identify and vote to hear cases presenting issues as to
which the conservative coalition would likely hang together. He would then
signal through repeated behavior a willingness to join without qualification any
majority opinion in these areas supported by the other four conservatives. This
would embolden the others to take on important cases in these areas and reach
results that would push the envelope in a conservative direction. It would also
stake out a claim for reciprocal treatment by other members of the coalition,
including perhaps on other issues, and more favorable opinion assignments
from the Chief.
On the negative side, a strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s position would
vote to deny certiorari and work to convince others to deny certiorari in cases
presenting issues in which the conservative coalition would be likely to fall
apart. This would include abortion, affirmative action, government speech on
religious topics, and many separation of powers issues.
If someone in Justice Scalia’s position had adopted such a strategic plan in
1994, the result would have been a sharp break in the character of the
Rehnquist Court, and that break would have corresponded fairly closely to the
changes outlined in Part II: The Court’s agenda would have turned away from
142. See SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & H. ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A CATTLE
RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (2002). For examples of Justice O’Connor’s
commitment to federalism, see, for example, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
143. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
144. All commentators agree that Chief Justice Rehnquist has been steadfastly committed
since his days as an Associate Justice to achieving a reduction of federal power and an
enhancement of states’ rights. See Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory,
and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 623 (1994) (and sources cited therein).
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social issues toward constitutional federalism; shifting coalitions would have
been replaced by a persistent 5-4 split with the conservatives in the majority,
and the Court would begin to reach significant doctrinal innovations in its new
areas of concentration.
The fact that one can hypothesize a the strategy that a rational actor in
Justice Scalia’s position might have adopted in mid-1990s that “fits” the facts
as they have unfolded since that time must be counted as at least some
evidence that the hypothesized strategy was in fact adopted. However, it is
hardly conclusive evidence. Some day, when the Justices’ papers for the
period in question become available, scholars may be able to uncover direct
evidence that either confirms or disconfirms the hypothesis of strategic
behavior by Justice Scalia. Unfortunately, one consequence of a Court with no
retirements is that no papers have become available for this period. For now,
we have to content ourselves with circumstantial evidence that either tends to
confirm or refute the hypothesis. That evidence is mixed. In order to keep the
discussion within manageable bounds, I will confine myself to the
circumstantial evidence about Justice Scalia’s position on questions of
constitutional federalism.
B.

Circumstantial Evidence Supporting the Strategic Hypothesis

There are a number of reasons to believe that when Justice Scalia joined
the Court in 1986 he could not be described as an advocate of states’ rights or a
general proponent of devolution of power from the federal government to the
states. Nothing in his background would suggest such an orientation. In
contrast to the other four members of today’s conservative coalition, Scalia had
never worked in state government, nor had he been active in state or local
politics.145 His entire professional career had been in federal service or in
teaching federal administrative law at national law schools.146 His three and
one-half years on the D.C. Circuit did nothing to deflect this orientation since
that court deals primarily with questions of federal law, and especially federal
administrative regulation.
Given this background, it is not surprising that Scalia had little occasion to
consider questions of constitutional federalism before he was appointed to the
Supreme Court. He did address the question of federal sovereign immunity,
writing early in his academic career one of the leading articles on this arcane
subject before it was largely rendered moot by amendments to the

145. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 292 (2d ed. 1996).
146. For a full chronological account of Scalia’s pre-judicial career and writings, see
RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 16-32
(1997).
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Administrative Procedure Act.147 This article and other remarks on the
subject148 indicate that Justice Scalia recognized that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has little claim either to historical legitimacy or practical efficacy.
Someone harboring these views about federal sovereign immunity would be
unlikely to give an unqualified endorsement to state sovereign immunity;
certainly he or she would be unlikely to press for an expansion of such
immunity, such as we have seen in recent years.
With respect to the more general topic of federalism, Justice Scalia’s prejudicial attitude is best captured in a short essay entitled The Two Faces of
Federalism, based on a speech he gave at the first National Symposium of the
Federalist Society, held at the Yale Law School in April 1982.149 In this
speech, Scalia criticized conservatives for their “unthinking extension” of
notions of natural autonomy from individuals to state governments. The
decision as to which level of government ought to decide any particular matter
should be “a pragmatic one,” he argued, not one driven by a “generalized
hostility towards national law which has become a common feature of
conservative thought.”150 Scalia warned against a tendency on the part of
conservatives to content themselves with having the federal government do
nothing and urged instead that they actively seek out areas where federal
preemption of state law and policy would promote “a policy of market
freedom.”151 As examples, he cited federal preemption of municipal franchise
restrictions on cable television systems and federal preemption of local rent
control laws. He concluded: “I urge you, then—as Hamilton would have urged
you—to keep in mind that the federal government is not bad but good. The
trick is to use it wisely.”152
This evidence from the period before his nomination is confirmed by
Justice Scalia’s behavior once he assumed his position on the Court. In his
first year, in a preview of things to come, the eight more senior Justices
engaged in a skirmish over the Eleventh Amendment in Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways.153 Justice Brennan, on behalf of four Justices, urged
the overruling of the venerable decision in Hans v. Louisiana,154 which had
extended the Eleventh Amendment beyond its narrow text (which mentions

147. Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970).
148. See Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, in SUPREME COURT
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, YEARBOOK 1985, at 103, 104, quoted in Erwin Chemerinsky, Against
Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1210 (2001).
149. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19 (1982).
150. Id. at 20.
151. Id. at 21.
152. Id. at 22.
153. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
154. Id. at 478.
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only suits by noncitizens) to include suits by citizens based on the presence of
a federal question.155 Justice Powell, writing for four other Justices, defended
Hans, primarily on grounds of stare decisis. The Court’s junior Justice
declined to take sides in the dispute, noting that the issue had barely been
mentioned in the briefs and at oral argument. He said:
I find both the correctness of Hans as an original matter, and the feasibility, if
it was wrong, of correcting it without distorting what we have done in tacit
reliance upon it, complex enough questions that I am unwilling to address them
in a case whose presentation focused on other matters.156

As his brief concurring opinion in Welch makes clear, Justice Scalia was at this
time genuinely dubitante on the issue. He seemed to regard Hans as
presumptively unsound, given its deviation from constitutional text and its
perpetuation of an outmoded doctrine. The issue was how to strike a balance
between the infirmities of the decision and the claims of stare decisis. (Three
years later, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,157 Justice Scalia resolved his
doubts in favor of reaffirming Hans as a matter of stare decisis.)
A further piece of circumstantial evidence tending to suggest the strategic
nature of Justice Scalia’s behavior on constitutional federalism is his voting
record in preemption cases. A true believer in states’ rights presumably would
want to see greater power devolve from the federal government to the states.
Such a sincere federalist would not only support formal limits on congressional
power and immunities for states from suits by private citizens grounded in
federal law, but he or she would also want to interpret the preemptive effect of
federal statutes narrowly, so as to leave as large an ambit of state regulatory
authority as possible.158 Yet Justice Scalia has been and remains one of the
most consistent supporters of broad interpretations of the preemptive scope of
federal law. Examples of this tendency on his part are legion; I list in the
footnote only some of those cases where Justice Scalia has supported federal
preemption, but either Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Thomas (both of

155. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
156. Welch, 483 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. 491 U.S. 1, 29-45 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. A somewhat analogous issue concerns the scope of the “Ex parte Young” exception to
state immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Presumably, a “true believer” in the
Eleventh Amendment would favor a narrow Ex parte Young doctrine. In Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe, Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion for the Court that included a section seeking to narrow
Ex parte Young in a number of respects. 521 U.S. 261, 270-80 (1997). However, he secured only
the vote of the Chief Justice for this section of the opinion; Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion objecting to the attempt to narrow Ex parte
Young. See id. at 288. Coeur d’Alene Tribe may, therefore, suggest that the Chief Justice and
Justice Kennedy may be more ardent states’ rights advocates, at least insofar as immunity from
suit is concerned, than are the other three conservatives, including Justice Scalia.
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whom are more consistent supporters of states’ rights) have voted against a
finding of preemption.159
Moving forward to the period after 1993, we find other contextual
evidence that Justice Scalia’s behavior in the constitutional federalism cases is
strategic. One piece of evidence—reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes’s dog that
did not bark—is the absence of any separate concurring opinions by Justice
Scalia in the Court’s post-Lopez federalism decisions.160 Justice Scalia has
written in only three of these cases, each time presumably pursuant to an
assignment by Chief Justice Rehnquist to write the opinion for the Court. In
sharp contrast to the other members of the federalism five, he has chosen not to
offer any additional thoughts or clarifications of his own views in concurring
opinions.161 Since one does not see similar self-restraint by Justice Scalia in
other contexts where he clearly cares about the issue,162 this suggests that he
remains, at best, uninterested in issues of constitutional federalism.
Closely related to the absence of separate opinions is the glaring
contradiction in many recent cases between the majority’s mode of analysis
and some of Justice Scalia’s most fervently held substantive and
159. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (Scalia, J., voting with
majority finding preemption; Thomas, J., voting with dissent); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366 (1999) (Scalia, J., writing for Court finding FCC rules broadly preemptive of state
regulation; Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part,
calling for total preemption of state tobacco liability claims; Rehnquist, C.J., joining opinion of
Stevens, J., finding only partial preemption); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374
(1992) (Scalia, J., writing opinion for the Court finding federal preemption of state regulation;
Rehnquist, C.J., joining dissent); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992)
(Scalia, J., voting with majority for preemption; Thomas, J. dissenting); Cal. Coastal Comm’n v.
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987) (Scalia, J., writing dissent finding state regulation of land
use on federal lands preempted; Rehnquist, C.J., writing for majority finding no preemption). For
a detailed survey of Justice Scalia’s alignment in federal preemption cases see BRISBIN, supra
note 146, at 128-34.
160. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), but only to address Justice O’Connor’s attack on his Free Exercise Clause opinion in
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which Congress had
sought to overturn in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
161. In Lopez, for example, Scalia was the only Justice voting in the majority who did not
either write an opinion or join a separate opinion besides Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority
opinion. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
162. Justice Scalia has written concurring or dissenting opinions in virtually every abortion
and affirmative action case that has been decided since he joined the Court. See, e.g., Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I had not intended to write separately
here until the focus of the other separate writings (including the one I have joined) gave me cause
to fear that this case might be taken to stand for an error different from the one that it actually
exemplifies.”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (outlining a more unyielding position on affirmative action than the one adopted in
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion).
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methodological convictions. As the Court’s federalism rulings have grown
bolder, some of its decisions have reached substantive judgments with which
Justice Scalia must be uncomfortable. Especially striking in this regard is
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank,163 which held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a private action against
the state for patent infringement. The holding effectively denies individual
patent owners any means of vindication for an important type of property right
when it is taken by a state.164 For the Court’s most consistent defender of
property rights, joining this decision must have entailed some hard swallowing.
Even more pronounced is the tension between the new federalism and
Justice Scalia’s methodological convictions. Both the Tenth Amendment’s
anti-commandeering principle and the extension of the Eleventh Amendment
to include actions in state court and before federal administrative agencies lack
any foundation in the text of the Constitution.165 In other contexts, such as
substantive due process and the dormant Commerce Clause, Justice Scalia has
been scornful of judicial doctrines that have no perceived foundation in the
constitutional text.166 Similarly, in both its Commerce Clause decisions (for
example, Lopez167 and Morrison168) and its Section 5 decisions (for example,
Florida Prepaid,169 Kimel,170 and Garrett171) the Rehnquist majority has
engaged in a close analysis of whether Congress has made sufficient “findings”
to justify its exercise of legislative power under these grants of authority. This

163. 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999).
164. See Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property:
The Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637 (2000).
165. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (interpreting
principle underlying the Eleventh Amendment to extend to complaints filed with federal
administrative agencies, notwithstanding that the text is limited to “any suit in law or equity”);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (interpreting principle underlying Eleventh Amendment to
extend to suits in state courts, notwithstanding that the text is limited to “[t]he judicial power of
the United States,” that is, federal courts); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(acknowledging that anti-commandeering principle lacks explicit textual basis in the
Constitution).
166. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 860 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(decrying the majority’s subjective “shocks-the-conscience” test for substantive due process
violations); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (declining to “fashion a new due
process right out of thin air”); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 480 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that there is no basis for a right to abortion in
text of the Constitution); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
254 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (stating that dormant Commerce
Clause has no textual basis in the Constitution and should not be expanded).
167. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
168. Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
169. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
170. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
171. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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process-based review entails an extensive foray into legislative history and
would seem to implicate all of the dangers of illegitimacy and manipulation
that Justice Scalia has cited in opposing the use of legislative history to
construe ambiguous statutes.172
Yet Justice Scalia has joined all of the Court’s recent constitutional
federalism decisions without any comment on the evident tension they present
with his otherwise fervently maintained methodological positions. As Phil
Frickey and Steven Smith have recently written in connection with processbased review in Commerce Clause and Section 5 cases, “[t]he majority’s
constitutional methodology of due deliberation in congressional proceedings is
so dramatically inconsistent with the statutory interpretation methodology of
[Justice Scalia] that concerns about candor and strategic behavior are
obvious.”173
Another source of evidence tending to suggest that Justice Scalia has been
behaving strategically is the content of the three states’ rights opinions he has
been assigned to write for the five-Justice majority. Although judgments about
these things are necessarily subjective, it is my impression that these opinions
reflect relatively little enthusiasm or engagement with the immediate question
at hand—constitutional federalism.174 Take Printz v. United States,175 his first
majority assignment in a post-Lopez federalism case. It is striking to compare
Justice O’Connor’s 1992 opinion for the Court in New York v. United States176
with Justice Scalia’s 1997 opinion in Printz. Justice O’Connor’s opinion
speaks with conviction and advances a clear theory of the case: that federal
statutes compelling state governments to enforce federal law destroy the
accountability of both federal and state governments and, hence, undermine the
integrity of the democratic process. Justice Scalia’s opinion, by contrast, is
listless and defensive; it begins by acknowledging that no textual provision of

172. For discussion of Justice Scalia’s approach to statutory interpretation and use of
legislative history, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988) (including quotations from Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of
Legislative History (1986), see id. at 454-55); Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice
Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (1994).
Justice Scalia has also lectured the Court about the proper use of legislative history in many
judicial opinions. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
173. Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1751 (2002).
174. This characterization also applies to the few constitutional federalism decisions he wrote
during the first Rehnquist Court. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991)
(Scalia, J., writing for 6-3 majority (including Souter) holding that the States’ immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment includes suits filed by Indian Tribes); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
176. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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the Constitution addresses the issue, spends many pages arguing against the
proposition that the anti-commandeering principle of New York is contrary to
historical practice and understandings, and ultimately finds the “most
conclusive[]” affirmative case to be the Court’s “prior jurisprudence,”177
meaning Justice O’Connor’s opinion five years earlier in New York.
Finally, there is also considerable evidence in his three assigned opinions
that Justice Scalia has sought to use these opportunities to create doctrine that
will have spillover effects in other areas of constitutional law. That is to say,
Justice Scalia’s federalism opinions tend not to be about federalism, but about
something else, if at all possible. In Printz, for example, his otherwise wooden
opinion becomes animated only when discussing a structural reason for
invalidating federal laws commandeering state officers, namely, that this
“shatter[s]” the principle of the unitary executive, thereby permitting Congress
to reduce the power of the President.178 Here we see Justice Scalia attempting
to re-ground the anti-commandeering principle in the separation of powers
doctrine of the unitary executive, a Scalia favorite rejected by the Court in
Morrison,179 but which he has subsequently sought to promote indirectly in a
number of contexts.180
The desire to use federalism cases to achieve other ends appears even more
starkly in his majority opinion in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens.181 The Court had granted certiorari presumably
to resolve a conflict in the circuits over whether the Eleventh Amendment bars
an action against a state by an individual bringing a qui tam suit in the name of
the United States.182 Justice Scalia threw himself with considerable gusto into
the threshold question whether qui tam suits violate the cases and controversies
limitation of Article III of the Constitution. This, of course, is another
separation of powers question, not a federalism question, and he resolved it in
favor of constitutionality—but with minimal damage to the unitary executive
theory—by reasoning that the qui tam relator acts as an assignee of the claim
177. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.
178. Id. at 923.
179. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
180. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) (adopting a test for
distinguishing inferior and principal officers that rests on whether the officer is accountable to a
superior in the executive hierarchy, along the lines he had advocated in his dissent in Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding
unconstitutional congressional grant of standing to sue under the Endangered Species Act to any
citizen in part because this interferes with unitary executive control of law enforcement).
181. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
182. In such an action, any damages awarded are divided between the qui tam relator, as a
reward for bringing the action, and the United States Treasury. Thus, the suit falls somewhere in
between an action by the United States against a state for damages (permissible under Eleventh
Amendment precedent) and an action by an individual against a state for damages (not
permissible under Eleventh Amendment precedent).
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of the United States. Then, after puzzling briefly over which issue should be
tackled next—the Eleventh Amendment or the question of statutory
interpretation whether states are “persons” under the False Claims Act—he
resolved to decide the statutory question first. The conclusion was that
Congress had not clearly included states within the definition of person; hence,
it was unnecessary to reach the Eleventh Amendment question. The upshot
was that Justice Scalia was able to write a separation of powers opinion and a
statutory interpretation opinion—two congenial exercises—and avoided
having to say anything about federalism at all.
A similar pattern can be discerned in College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board.183 This was another
Eleventh Amendment case, the question being whether Congress could create a
cause of action against state governments for engaging in false advertising
about a commercial product offered by a state agency. Two issues were
presented: first, whether Congress had the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity against such a suit under Section 5, on the ground that the legislation
protected individuals from deprivations of their property without due process
of law by states; and second, whether the state had constructively waived its
immunity by entering the commercial marketplace with knowledge of the
existence of the federal cause of action.
On the abrogation issue, Justice Scalia avoided the path of other recent
Section 5 decisions, which examine whether Congress has developed an
adequate record of state disregard of constitutional rights to justify legislation
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against the States.184 Instead, Justice
Scalia reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply because the
plaintiff had no property right in being free of false advertising. In effect, he
confined the scope of “property” under the Due Process Clause to private
exclusion rights—a holding that avoided any need to delve into legislative
history, and that might work in future cases to cut back the scope of
substantive due process (a disfavored doctrine in Justice Scalia’s eyes).185
With respect to waiver, Justice Scalia was able to write an essay on the general
circumstances in which an individual can be said to waive a constitutional
right. The central point was that the Court generally requires that such waivers
be knowing and voluntary, conditions Scalia found not satisfied by merely
entering a certain field of commercial activity.186 Again, the objective seemed
to be at least in part to reinforce the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, rather
183. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
184. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
185. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885,
997 (2000).
186. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 681-83.
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than enter into the fray on the question of the proper scope of sovereign
immunity per se. In any event, Scalia managed once again to write a majority
opinion in a federalism case without saying much about states’ rights. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that Justice Scalia’s support for the Rehnquist
majority in these cases is strategic.
C. Circumstantial Evidence Against the Strategic Hypothesis
Not all the circumstantial evidence supports the strategic actor hypothesis,
however. There are, first of all, a number of problems of timing. The biggest
is Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,187
written in 1989.
The question was whether an amendment to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, defining the parties potentially liable to pay for waste cleanup costs, had
abrogated the states’ immunity from such suits under the Eleventh
Amendment. The Justices addressed two issues: first, whether Congress had
spoken sufficiently clearly in the CERCLA amendment to abrogate state
sovereign immunity and, second, whether Congress, in fact, has constitutional
authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The Court fractured badly, but when the dust settled
there were five votes for the proposition that Congress had spoken sufficiently
clearly, and five votes for the proposition that Congress had the power. Justice
Scalia’s separate opinion contributed to the complex math needed to patch
together this outcome.188 He took the position that Congress had spoken
sufficiently clearly, but that it did not have the power to abrogate. On the latter
point, Justice Scalia’s opinion foreshadowed the Court’s decision in Seminole
Tribe189 in 1996, which overruled Union Gas.
On its face, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Union Gas would suggest that, at
least with respect to the Eleventh Amendment, he willingly joined up with the
states’ rights coalition in 1989, well before the critical period of 1993-94 when
I have suggested a strategic actor in his position would have made such a
move. A closer consideration of his position in Union Gas, however, does not
completely support this assessment. If Scalia had deliberately decided to join
forces with the federalism team in 1989, one would expect him to agree with
the other conservatives that CERCLA did not clearly abrogate the states’
immunity. This would have changed the outcome in the case (since Justice
White found that Congress had not clearly abrogated), delivering a 5-4
conservative victory. In contrast, the position he adopted (clear abrogation, but
no power to abrogate) translated into a conservative defeat by giving the
liberals five votes in support of state liability—hardly what a true believer in
187. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
188. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 124, at 18-20.
189. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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states’ rights would desire. Still, Justice Scalia had undeniably crossed the
Rubicon on whether Congress has power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
under its Article I powers, a proposition that forms one of the pillars of the
federalism revolution of the second Rehnquist Court, and he did so in 1989—
well before the watershed events that marked the turning point in the character
of that Court.
New York v. United States190 marks another, if lesser, problem of timing.
There, Justice Scalia silently joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion creating
another pillar of the Rehnquist federalism revolution—the anti-commandeering
principle of the Tenth Amendment. This was in 1992, again slightly before the
time period when I have hypothesized that a strategic Justice Scalia would
have become a federalist. Of course, it is possible that Justice Scalia was being
strategic in this case for more conventional reasons. Both Casey191 and Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,192 a landmark takings case in which Scalia
was critically dependent on Justice O’Connor’s vote, were also pending before
the Court, and Justice Scalia may have been anxious to appear supportive of
Justice O’Connor’s efforts in New York in the hope of securing reciprocal
cooperation in these other cases (he failed, of course, in Casey, but succeeded
in Lucas).
Somewhat more subtly, there is evidence from Justice Scalia’s dissenting
opinions from as late as 1996 that he continued to assess the progress of the
Court largely in terms of its judgments in cases raising social issues. This was
the year of the Colorado anti-gay rights initiative193 and the VMI sex
discrimination case,194 both of which elicited furious Scalia dissents. His
frustration boiled over at the end of the Term. Dissenting in a pair of First
Amendment-political patronage decisions, he wrote: “The Court must be living
in another world. Day by day, case by case, it is busy designing a Constitution
for a country I do not recognize.”195 Justice Scalia made no mention in this
dire assessment of Seminole Tribe,196 also decided that Term, or Lopez,197
decided the year before. Evidently, these conservative victories did not loom
very large in his thinking about the overall direction of the Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence.
My strategic hypothesis also posits that after 1993 Justice Scalia would
deliberately abstain from voting to grant review in social issues cases,
recognizing that he did not have the votes to achieve his substantive
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
Bd. of County Comm’rs, v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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objectives.198 Since we do not have docket sheets for the years in question, it
is impossible to say for sure how Justice Scalia has voted in such cases after
1993. The fragmentary evidence that does exist, however, is not consistent
with this supposition of strategic self-restraint on his part. In fact, Justice
Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and either Justice White or Justice Thomas,
has dissented from denials of certiorari in three abortion cases since Casey,
including two that arose after Justice White left the Court.199 Similarly, in
2001 the Court declined to review a decision ordering the removal of a granite
monument outside the Elkhart, Indiana court house commemorating the Ten
Commandments. Once again, three Justices joined in a written dissent from
denial—Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.200
These episodes tend to suggest that it is not the most conservative Justices,
including Justice Scalia, who are resisting the urge to put hot button social
issues cases on the docket. Rather, that resistance is coming from Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy, who are evidently content to leave the Court’s
doctrine in these areas where it stands.
D. On Balance
So is the phenomenon of the second Rehnquist Court a product of strategic
behavior by Justice Scalia or not? The final judgment is difficult because it is
hard to distinguish between two characterizations of the evidence: (1) that
Justice Scalia has been behaving strategically in the constitutional federalism
cases, in the sense that he does not sincerely believe in the Court’s innovations
but has gone along out of a desire to achieve some of the goals listed in subpart
A (obtaining majority opinion assignments, building up obligations of
reciprocity with other Justices, pleasing the Chief, ensuring a legacy); and (2)
that Justice Scalia has not been behaving strategically, because he sincerely

198. Political scientists have shown that Justices at least occasionally vote strategically at the
certiorari stage in light of the their assessments of the probable votes of other Justices on the
merits of the case. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991) (interview data); Caldeira et al., supra note 74
(regression analysis of all petitions on the discuss list in one Term).
199. See Voinovich v. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp., 523 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari from
decision striking down state abortion statute on the authority of Casey); Janklow v. Planned
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1176 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari from decision invalidating
parental notification statute); Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obsts. and Gyns., 506 U.S. 1011 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & White, J.) (dissenting from denial of certiorari
from decision striking down as facially invalid a Guam statute prohibiting all non-emergency
abortions).
200. City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1059 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined
by Scalia & Thomas, JJ.).
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believes that the states’ rights position in these cases is marginally preferable
to the nationalist position.
My own judgment is that evidence somewhat better supports the strategic
characterization. First, this is not a situation where Justice Scalia’s behavior
can be chalked up to a sincere desire for clear majority rulings on issues of
importance. Justice Scalia presumably could implement such a desire either by
voting with the states’ rights faction, or voting with the nationalist faction. In a
closely divided Court, he is, in effect, the swing vote on this issue and could
produce a clear majority ruling by going either way.
Second, Justice Scalia’s voting record in recent years has gone well
beyond what one would expect of a Justice with only a mildly sincere
preference for the states’ rights position. Take the Eleventh Amendment.
Even if we grant that Justice Scalia sincerely concluded in 1989 that Hans201
should not be overruled on grounds of stare decisis, it does not follow that he
would then feel compelled to join opinions extending the Eleventh Amendment
to actions filed in states’ courts or federal administrative agencies. Someone
who sincerely thought that the case for preserving Hans was slightly better
than the case for overruling Hans would most logically take the position
thereafter that the principle of Hans should be confined to its historical sphere
(that is, private actions against states in federal courts). Instead, Justice Scalia
has joined in a series of 5-4 decisions that have transformed the Eleventh
Amendment into one of our most sweeping and vigorously enforced
constitutional rights.
So I conclude that Justice Scalia has been behaving strategically and that
the consequences have been huge. I will be the first to acknowledge, however,
that a final accounting on this intriguing question will have to await further
excavations of more complete archival materials.
V. THE EXTERNAL STRATEGIC ACTOR MODEL: TIMIDITY AT THE CENTER
In addition to strategic behavior within the Court, political scientists have
also hypothesized that Justices behave strategically by modifying their
preferences in light of the views of other political institutions and the general
public. They do so, it is assumed, because they want their policy preferences
to stick—to be respected and enforced by other power centers in society. The
external strategic actor model, like its internal counterpart, begins with the
assumption that Justices seek to maximize their personal policy preferences.202
It further posits, however, that to accomplish this goal, the Justices must not
only assemble coalitions of at least five votes within the Court, they must also
201. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
202. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress
and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 28-33 (1997) (providing an overview of this branch of
strategic actor theory).
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calibrate the reactions of other political institutions and the public at large in
order to determine how far those views can be pressed without triggering a
backlash. The external strategic model therefore comes in two versions: the
separation-of-powers version, which focuses on strategic interaction between
the Court and the other branches of government,203 and the public opinion
version, which focuses on the strategic interaction between the Court and the
views of the public.204
Both versions hypothesize highly sophisticated behavior on the part of
individual Justices. The separation of powers version assumes that the Justices
have extensive knowledge about the preferences of each House of Congress,
including the key members of its complex committee system, and that they
have relevant information about the policy positions of important actors within
the executive branch, including not just the White House, but also the far-flung
system of administrative departments and agencies. The public opinion
version assumes that the Justices are aware of the distribution of views of the
public on a variety of issues that come before the Court, and that they know
something about the intensity with which those views are held and how they
are distributed demographically.
These are rather heroic assumptions, to say the least, and they lend an air
of implausibility to the external strategic actor models.205 Although the
Justices read newspapers, and some of them socialize with Washington
politicians, they generally lead insulated lives, spending most of their days
ensconced in a marble building overseeing a staff of eager young lawyers
processing piles of legal papers. When they venture forth to make speeches or
receive awards, they are escorted by U.S. Marshals and treated by their hosts
like visiting royalty. To be sure, the Justices may be able to rely on various
proxies for the views of other political institutions and the general public, such
as amicus curiae briefs, the filing of which has ballooned in recent decades.206
Undoubtedly, the most important source of information for the Court about
the views of the other branches is the Solicitor General, the official in the
Justice Department who is charged by statute with presenting the position of
the government in any case “in which the United States is interested.”207
Except in rare cases, the Solicitor General represents all executive branch

203. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 138. For an analysis by a legal scholar amplifying
some of these concerns, see Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149 (1998).
204. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 138.
205. See Segal, supra note 202, at 31 (noting that the theory assumes perfect and complete
information by Justices).
206. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000) (documenting the rise of amicus
briefs and attempting to measure their influence).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (2000).
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entities before the Court—traditional departments and independent agencies
alike. Moreover, the Solicitor General usually—but not always—represents
the views of both the executive and Congress.208 Thus, the Solicitor General
acts as a kind of synthesizer who presents the Court with a position that the
other branches of the federal government can “live with.” The external
strategic actor model would predict that the Court would give great weight to
these views, and, in fact, innumerable studies have shown that the Solicitor
General enjoys an extraordinary degree of success, both in influencing the
Court’s agenda and its outcomes.209
A.

The Separation of Powers Version

The separations of powers version of the external strategic actor model is
especially intriguing as a source of explanation for the changing character of
the Rehnquist Court after 1994.210 This date corresponds almost exactly with
an inversion in control of the two other major branches of the federal
government. As of 1992, a conservative administration and liberal legislature
had come to be seen as almost part of the natural political order. The
Republicans had controlled the White House for twelve straight years, and for
twenty of the last twenty-four years. During this same span of time, Congress
had been nearly always controlled by the Democrats. Then, in the span of two
years, everything turned upside down. Bill Clinton ousted George Bush senior
from the White House in the election of 1992; just two years later, the
Republicans roared into control of both Houses of Congress under the banner
of their “Contract with America.” For the first time in most people’s memory,
suddenly we had a liberal administration and conservative legislature.
How would a Court dominated by a narrow conservative majority react to
such an upheaval in the external political world? One prediction would be that
the Court would become less deferential to executive branch legal positions.
The argument runs as follows: Before 1993 the executive would tend to adopt
conservative legal positions. These positions might not reflect the

208. At least, Solicitors General have generally recognized an obligation to defend the
statutes enacted by Congress before the Court, unless they impinge upon the constitutional
prerogatives of the executive or are patently unconstitutiuonal under settled precedent. For a
discussion, see Waxman, supra note 51.
209. See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 145, at 632 tbl.7-13 (success rates on the merits);
Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988) (success rates in influencing grant of
review).
210. This model is one of the few political science theories about judicial behavior that has
been developed and applied extensively by a law professor, William Eskridge of Yale Law
School. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions]; Eskridge, supra note 15.
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administration’s sincere conservative views—they would be moderated by the
threat of override by the more liberal Congress. Congressional override,
however, would not be automatic, of course, since Congress has a finite
capacity to adopt legislation in any given session, and any attempt at override
must take into account the threat of a presidential veto. So the administration’s
legal positions would tend to be conservative, but tempered by the strategic
reality of potential congressional opposition. A strategic conservative Justice,
in turn, understanding this, would tend to endorse the positions of the
conservative administration, regarding them as a reasonably good barometer of
how conservative one could get in interpreting the law without triggering a
legislative override.
After 1994, the calculus would change. Now the executive would tend to
adopt liberal legal positions, tempered by the threat of override from what is
now a conservative, but as always agenda- and veto-constrained, Congress. In
these circumstances, a strategic conservative Justice would have a greater
incentive to reject the executive position. The executive might successfully
calibrate its positions so as to minimize the risk of direct override by Congress.
If those positions were rejected by the Court in favor of a more conservative
interpretation, however, the executive would find it virtually impossible to
mobilize a conservative Congress to take affirmative steps to override the
Court’s interpretation. In short, the external strategic actor model would
predict that the strategic conservative Justice would switch from a position of
deference to executive interpretations of law during the 1986-1992 period, to a
position tending to reject executive interpretations during the 1995-2001
period.
It is not difficult to find individual cases that are consistent with this
hypothesis. Compare, for example, Rust v. Sullivan,211 decided toward the end
of the first Rehnquist Court in 1991, with FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.,212 decided during the second Rehnquist Court in 2000. Rust
involved the Public Heath Service Act of 1970, a statute that provides federal
grants to family planning clinics. The Reagan Administration adopted a
regulation interpreting the statute as precluding any mention of abortion by
doctors providing counseling to women in clinics funded under the Act. The
administration apparently calculated (correctly, it would seem) that Congress
would not seek to override the interpretation, since it involved funding of
clinics serving poor women, but did not interfere with reproductive options of
women more generally. True to what the external strategic actor model would
seem to predict, the first Rehnquist Court upheld this restrictive interpretation,
concluding in a 5-4 decision that it was entitled to deference, notwithstanding
the presence of plausible constitutional objections based on the First
211. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
212. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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Amendment and the abortion decisions. This would seem to be an illustration
of a conservative Court majority deferring to the judgment of a conservative
administration and avoiding override by a liberal Congress.213
Brown & Williamson, decided during the second Rehnquist Court,
presented the question of whether the Food and Drug Administration has
regulatory jurisdiction over tobacco products as conventionally marketed. The
Clinton Administration, in one of its boldest domestic policy initiatives,
interpreted the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as conferring such
authority on the FDA, even though the FDA had consistently disclaimed such
authority in the past. The agency proceeded to adopt far-reaching regulations,
designed to curb smoking by teens, that would affect the way cigarettes are
marketed and sold in every corner store in the country. In another 5-4
decision, the Court invalidated the regulations, holding that the overall pattern
of legislation related to tobacco products, enacted against the backdrop of the
FDA’s historical hands-off position, meant that Congress had a “clear intent”
to deny the agency any jurisdiction over tobacco products. Here, we would
seem to have an illustration of a conservative majority overriding an
interpretation by a liberal administration. So far, the conservative Congress
has not moved on legislation that would reverse the decision and confer
regulatory authority over tobacco products on the FDA.214
This kind of anecdotal evidence is not especially persuasive, however,
since it is always possible to find isolated cases that appear to support a
particular prediction about judicial behavior. Unfortunately, more systematic
testing of the external strategic actor hypothesis is difficult for a variety of
reasons. One problem is that the cases involving executive interpretations of
statutes that might test the hypothesis range from highly controversial
questions of public policy—such as the abortion counseling regulation in Rust
and the tobacco marketing regulations in Brown & Williamson—to dry and
technical issues—such as how to calculate offsets to social security benefits for
past overpayments.215 Thus, some cases will elicit strong reactions from the
Justices based on their individual policy preferences, and others will not.
Where the Justices do not care much about the policy, presumably they will
not devote much time to pondering the reactions of the other branches to their
decision. Another problem is time lags. Sometimes executive interpretations
come before the Court many years after they have been promulgated, and the
213. As one of his first official acts as President, Bill Clinton directed that the interpretation
be reversed. See Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us About
American Politics, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 305 (1994). The new interpretation also avoided
override by Congress.
214. Senator Edward Kennedy has introduced legislation to overturn the decision, but so far it
has not made significant progress. See Allison Fass, Senator Kennedy’s Attempt to Give the
F.D.A. Power Over the Tobacco Industry Faces Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at C9.
215. See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990).
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degree of commitment of the current administration to the interpretation is
unclear. A third problem is that the Court gives different degrees of deference
to executive interpretations, depending on the formality with which the
interpretation has been rendered.216 Finally, the cases present infinite variety
in terms of how much interpretative latitude the statute in question truly
confers. All Justices are committed to invalidating executive action that is
manifestly inconsistent with legislation duly enacted by Congress. So legal
factors always have to be weighed against the desire to effectuate policy
preferences. Given all these difficulties, it is not necessarily meaningful to
compare the overall “affirmance” and “reversal” rate for executive
interpretations in the two Rehnquist Courts.
In an effort to avoid some of these problems, I offer a more limited study,
based on the Court’s acceptance or rejection of the Solicitor General’s position
in cases involving interpretations of civil rights statutes.217 These are all cases
in which the Court’s decision is subject to override by Congress. They are also
cases in which the Justices almost always know the position of the executive
branch because the Solicitor General invariably files a brief informing the
Court of the incumbent administration’s position about how the statute should
be interpreted. Finally, nearly all these cases involve issues that have
relatively high political salience, and, hence, the Justices are likely to have
policy preferences about how they should be resolved.
Specifically, I examined all civil rights cases decided by the first Rehnquist
Court during the last three years of the Reagan Administration (October Terms
1986, 1987, and 1988), and compared this to all civil rights cases decided by
the second Rehnquist Court during the last three years of the Clinton
Administration (October Terms 1997, 1998, and 1999). By coincidence, there
were twenty-three civil rights decisions during each three-year period. In all
but one of the forty-six cases, the Solicitor General filed a brief, either as a
party or, more commonly, as amicus curiae. For each case, I determined the
position of the Solicitor General, the disposition of the Court, and, if the
Court’s disposition differed from the position of the Solicitor General, whether
the disagreement was in the direction of a more “liberal” position (pro-plaintiff
or expansive view of civil rights), a more “conservative” position (prodefendant or narrow view of civil rights), or an “unclear” position (not easy to

216. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 852-63 (2001).
217. I include in the category of civil rights statutes Sections 1981 and 1982 of the original
Civil Rights Acts, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, and more recent enactments such as
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. I consider only cases that turn on the proper interpretation of these statutes (as
opposed to their constitutionality).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

626

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:569

categorize or no Solicitor General brief). The results are summarized in Table
1 below.218
TABLE 1
Civil Rights Cases: Agreement With Solicitor General

OT
8688
OT
9799

Total
Cases

Agree
w/
SG

Disagree
w/ SG

SG
Success
Rate

Liberal
Deviation

Conservative
Deviation

Unclear

23

10

12

43%

8

2

2

23

17

6

74%

0

6

0

The results are inconsistent with what the separation of powers model
would suggest in a number of ways. The model suggests that during the first
Rehnquist Court, the conservative majority would be especially deferential to
the conservative administration. Instead, we find that the Court adopted the
position advocated by the Solicitor General in only 43% of these cases—well
below the overall benchmark rate of success of the Solicitor General as amicus
filer (about 70%).219 Moreover, when the Court during these years rejected the
position of the Solicitor General, it was much more likely to do so in a liberal,
rather than a conservative, direction. To confound matters even further,
shortly after this period, Congress retaliated against the overly “conservative”
nature of the Court’s civil rights decisions by enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1991,220 which overruled no less than six of the Court’s civil rights decisions
from the three years in question.221 Thus, it would appear that either the Court

218. The cases used to generate Table 1 are listed in Appendix B at the end of this lecture.
219. See Reginald S. Sheehan, et al., Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct
Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464, 465 tbl.1 (1992) (reporting 67.3%
success rate for the Solicitor General representing the United States as a party from 1951-1988);
Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren and Burger
Courts: A Research Note, 41 W. POL. Q. 135, 136 (1988) (reporting 75% success rate for
Solicitor General as amicus curiae during similar period).
220. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
221. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled five of these decisions: Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance
v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The sixth decision, Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of
Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), was separately overruled by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

THE MAKING OF THE SECOND REHNQUIST COURT

627

was not being very strategic during this period, or that the Justice Department
did a poor job of gauging how far the law could be pressed without triggering a
congressional reaction, or both.
A closer look at the decisions during this period reveals some possible
explanations for these curious results. The liberal deviations nearly all occur in
the 1986 and 1987 Terms and, hence, may in part reflect the fact that Justices
White and Powell (and even Justice Scalia during this time period) were far
from invariably conservative in civil rights cases. By the time we get to the
October 1988 Term, however, the Court had shifted toward a much more
consistently conservative pattern in its rulings. Indeed, in this year the Court
rejected the Solicitor General’s position in favor of an even more conservative
position in two cases, both of which became targets in the congressional
overruling exercise.222 So it may be that the administration was not that far off
in calibrating how far the Court could go without triggering congressional
retaliation, but the Court undershot the mark in 1987 and 1988, and then
overshot the mark in 1989.
Obviously, however, even this revised
interpretation provides no support for the thesis that the Justices behave
strategically in the sense of calculating the risk of retaliation from other
branches of government. It appears more accurate to characterize the first
Rehnquist Court as bungling along in a very nonstrategic fashion in civil rights
cases.
When we look at the years 1997, 1998, and 1999 during the second
Rehnquist Court, we also find that the outcomes do not correspond with the
predictions of the model. During these years, the Court agreed with the
submission of the Solicitor General 74% of the time, which is at or slightly
above the overall success rate of the Solicitor General. In other words, the
Court was considerably more deferential to the Clinton Administration in civil
rights cases than it had been to the Reagan Administration. The only inkling of
a result that corresponds with the model is that when the Court deviated from
the path outlined by the Solicitor General in these years, it invariably did so by
adopting a more conservative position. Overall, however, although the second
Rehnquist Court appears to behave much more consistently in civil rights cases
than the first Rehnquist Court, one would have to characterize its behavior as
at most very mildly strategic in a separation of powers sense.
I do not suggest that this modest study is, in any respect, the last word on
the separation of powers model. It does suggest, however, that this version of
the external strategic actor model is of limited value in explaining the

overruled seven other decisions not included in my sample. See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 210, at 333 n.4 (1991).
222. The two cases were Betts and Lorance, see supra note 221. In the negotiations over the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Bush Administration did not object to the overruling of these two
decisions.
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differences between the first and second Rehnquist Courts.223 This is not to
say that the switch in control of political branches after 1994 has played no
role at all in the transformation of the Rehnquist Court. Most critically,
Republican control of Congress has probably eliminated any significant risk of
a congressional counterattack against the Court’s many invalidations of its
enactments based on States’ rights principles. It has been reported that key
Republicans in Congress are “‘comfortable with most of the Court’s
rulings,’”224 which, of course, greatly reduces, if it does not eliminate, any
threat to overturn them. Indeed, there has been no indication to date of any
backlash against the federalism rulings from Congress.
B.

Public Opinion

The second version of the external strategic actor model focuses on public
opinion. Political scientists have long been fascinated by the possibility that
the Justices, although insulated by design from public accountability, in fact
take public opinion into account in formulating their more important
decisions.225 The reasons why a strategically-minded Justice might want to
take public opinion into account are similar to, if slightly more complicated
than, the reasons why such a Justice might want to take the views of the other
branches of government into account.
One reason builds from the logic underlying the proposition that a strategic
Justice will want to take into account the preferences of other political
institutions like Congress and the executive. Again, we start with the
assumption that the Justice seeks to maximize his or her personal policy
preferences. This requires not only that the Justice assemble a coalition of five
votes inside the Court, but also that the other political branches do not nullify
the resulting decision. The other political branches, in turn, are subject to
periodic elections, and, thus, their preferences will be attuned to public
opinion. Ultimately, then, a strategic Justice will realize that the decisions of
the Court will be implemented by the other branches of government only if
they do not deviate too far from dominant public opinion.
Another reason why a Justice might heed public opinion is more direct.
Various commentators have speculated about the possibility that the Justices,
or some of them at least, are motivated by a desire to enhance their

223. See Segal, supra note 202 (expressing skepticism about the empirical support for the
separation of powers model).
224. Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s AntiCongress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 461 (2001) (quoting Representative Lee Hamilton).
225. For an overview, see THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME
COURT (1989); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 (1993).
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reputations.226 Having a good reputation translates into tangible benefits, such
as expense-paid appearances at seminars held in posh resorts, and intangible
benefits, such as awards, honors, and praise from editorial writers and other
opinion leaders. For a Justice motivated by these kinds of reputational
concerns, it might be important to assure that the Court reaches decisions
supported by a majority of the public, or at least by elite opinion leaders,
because this will tend to push up the “approval ratings” of the Court (and of the
Justice) and, with it, the Justice’s general reputation.
The public opinion hypothesis, to a greater extent even than the separation
of powers model, lacks plausibility as applied to all but a small fraction of the
Court’s caseload. Public opinion can be ascertained with confidence on only a
few issues, like abortion, prayer in public schools, and the death penalty.227
For most of the issues considered by the Court, there are no polling data, and if
there were, they would be largely worthless. Consider the Eleventh
Amendment, an issue that has excited some of the most energetic exchanges
among the Justices during the second Rehnquist Court. If pollsters asked
members of the general public whether they think the States should enjoy
immunity from private lawsuits grounded in federal law, the response would
most likely be: “No opinion.” Still, one should not rule out the possibility that
public opinion matters as to the narrow slice of cases in which the issues are
salient and the public has ascertainable views.
In considering the role of public opinion in influencing the behavior of the
Rehnquist Court, it is natural to focus our attention on two Justices: O’Connor
and Kennedy. Court watchers have long suggested that these two Justices are
the most sensitive to external forces.228 Political scientists have also theorized

226. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); Frederick Schauer, Incentives,
Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 61924 (2000).
227. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 145, at 675-702 (collecting public polling data on a
variety of issues such as abortion, the death penalty, affirmative action, and prayer in the schools,
but not federalism and separation of powers issues).
228. Indeed, scholars have debated which of the two is the “most dangerous” Justice. See
Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63, 96 (1996) (nominating Kennedy); Lynn A. Baker,
Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 206-07 (1996) (responding to Edelman and Chen and nominating
O’Connor); Edelman & Chen, supra note 19, at 192 (responding to Baker and renominating
Kennedy). The answer appears to depend on whether one asks who is most likely to be the
median voter in contested cases (answer: Justice O’Connor), or asks who demonstrates the
penchant for joining the greatest variety of coalitions of Justices (answer: Justice Kennedy).
Lynn Baker has nominated O’Conner based on her status as median voter; Edelman and Chen
urge that the accolade goes to Kennedy, given his dexterity in joining the largest variety of
coalitions.
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that moderate Justices are more likely to be influenced by changes in public
opinion and have developed statistical tests tending to support this
proposition.229
In order to say that public opinion can explain the differences between the
first and second Rehnquist Courts, it is necessary to show that something
happened in the early-to-mid-1990s that would have caused the Court, or at
least Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, to become sensitized to public opinion
in a way that it or they had not been before. That is, we need to identify some
dramatic event or events that would have driven home the reality of public
opposition in such a way as to have caused certain Justices to abandon the
conservative position on social issues or, at least, to seek to avoid cases that
present those issues.
When we cast our eyes back to the fall of 1991, we can, in fact, reconstruct
how just such a jolt may have been delivered. It did not happen in a single
blow, but rather in a series of events over a compressed period of time, which,
as far as I know, have never been linked together and considered from the
perspective of the sitting Justices.
The first event was the climax of the Clarence Thomas confirmation
hearings. The main part of the hearings were completed in the summer of
1991, and featured many of the same issues that had dominated the hearings
over the nomination of Robert Bork in 1987—such as abortion, other privacy
rights, and affirmative action.230 Many of the same political forces that had
been aligned against Bork also came out against Thomas. This may have been
discomforting to the conservative Justices, but no more so than the process had
been four years earlier when Bork was subjected to a grilling on these issues.
What was surely far more unsettling was the unexpected reopening of the
Thomas hearings that took place on national television on October 11-13,
1991, featuring Anita Hill’s allegations of inappropriate sexual advances and
Thomas’s heated denial and counter-allegation of racism. One subliminal
message this extraordinary spectacle sent to the Justices was that the
opposition to the nominee and the positions it was assumed he would support
was extremely intense—so intense that the opponents were willing to breach
unwritten norms about the type of uncorroborated accusations that are fit for
public ventilation in confirmation hearings. The severe hazing of Thomas thus
served as a warning to the sitting Justices that if they persisted down the path

229. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169 (1996). Mishler
and Sheehan include Justices O’Connor and Kennedy on the list of moderate Justices from 19531992 who appear to be more responsive to public opinion than other Justices. Id. at 188.
230. See, e.g., 2 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas, supra note 86, at 261-474 (testimony
of Patricia King, Marcia Greenberger, and Judith Lichtman).
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of seeking to overturn Roe and securing other conservative objectives, they
could expect equivalent retaliation of an unspecified nature.
The second event, which followed close on the heels of the Thomas
hearings, was the Bush Administration’s capitulation in the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.231 The statute was designed to be, and was, a
massive rebuke to the Court. The Bush Justice Department, which included
many lawyers who had urged the Justices to adopt the positions the statute
would repudiate, initially fought the measure, and Bush successfully sustained
a veto of an earlier version of the Act in 1990. After the debacle of the
Thomas hearings, however, several Senators who had voted to sustain the
earlier veto told the Administration it could no longer count on their votes.232
Seeing the handwriting on the wall, the Administration cut the best face-saving
deal it could under the circumstances, and the President signed the revised
measure. No doubt observing all this with keen interest, the Justices could not
but help draw the conclusion that the path the Court had been following in civil
rights cases—often at the urging of the Republican Justice Department—in
fact, lacked popular political support.
The third event was the filing of the petition for certiorari in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,233 the abortion case that
was to become the defining moment of the Rehnquist Court. The petition was
filed on November 7, shortly after the Administration announced its
capitulation on the Civil Rights Act and two weeks before the bill was signed
into law. Two things were extraordinary about the petition. First, it was filed
more than two months before the filing deadline, indicating that the pro-choice
petitioners were racing to have the petition granted and argued before the end
of the 1991 Term. Second, there was only one question presented: “Has the
Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding that a
woman’s right to choose abortion is a fundamental right protected by the
United States Constitution?”234 Clearly, the petitioners—who favored abortion
rights—were angling for a definitive showdown on abortion by July 1992.
Why would they want that? The most logical inference, which has been
subsequently confirmed by interviews with the attorneys involved,235 is that
they were playing a high-stakes game of chicken with the Court. Either the

231. For a good account of the politics of the Act, focusing on the position of the Bush
Administration, see Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 955, 982-999 (1993).
232. Id. at 996. Two Senators, John Warner of Virginia and Ted Stevens of Alaska, informed
the Administration of their decision on October 23, and the Administration announced its
willingness to compromise and sign the Civil Rights Act on October 24. Id.
233. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
234. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit at i, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744).
235. LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 460-66.
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Court, reinforced now with the vote of Justice Thomas, would persist in its
apparent path toward overruling Roe, or the Court would blink and reaffirm
Roe. If the Court chose the former path, then the 1992 Presidential elections
would become a massive referendum on abortion rights, which the petitioners
assumed they would win, resulting in the election of a Democratic President
and Senate and the appointment of new Justices sympathetic to Roe. If the
Court chose the latter path, then Roe and the right to abortion would be secured
for the indefinite future.
There is evidence that the Justices were fully aware of the trap that was
being set for them. Chief Justice Rehnquist reportedly relisted the Casey
petition for several weeks after it was ready for consideration, evidently
seeking to delay a vote by the Conference until it would be too late to schedule
the case for argument in the spring of 1992.236 If this happened, then the case
would be argued in October or November 1992, and the decision would be
handed down after the Presidential election was safely over. However, Justice
Blackmun (perhaps joined by Justice Stevens) protested against this
transparent maneuver, and Chief Justice Rehnquist eventually relented.237
When the Casey petition was granted on January 21, the Court made one last,
desperate effort to avoid a showdown on Roe, limiting the grant of certiorari to
whether specific provisions of the Pennsylvania statute were
unconstitutional.238 The parties, however, ignored the limited grant in their
briefs, and when the case was argued on April 22, 1992 (the last argument day
of the 1991 Term), they openly debated the soundness of Roe—as, of course,
the Justices did in their decision.
In short, in October-November 1991, three events transpired in quick
succession, which cumulatively may have sent a stark warning to the Court
that it was courting disaster in terms of its standing with public opinion: the
public humiliation of Thomas, followed by the Bush Administration’s
acquiescence in the repudiation of the Court’s position on civil rights, followed
by the petition in Casey, daring the Court to overrule Roe before the 1992
elections. The upshot, as we now know, is that the Court blinked. Not only
did five Justices vote to reaffirm the “essential holding” of Roe in Casey, but
the Court also reaffirmed the strict ban on prayer in public schools in Lee v.
Weisman.239 The Court’s strategic retreat in June 1992 did not, however, end
the warning signals about public opinion. The 1992 elections not only resulted
in the ouster of George Bush and the election of President Clinton, but—
perhaps more tellingly—they also produced a near doubling in the number of

236.
237.
238.
List).
239.

Id. at 462-63.
Id.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 502 U.S. 1056, 1056-57 (1992) (Order
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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women elected to serve in Congress.240 Observers have credited a stillsimmering backlash by women voters over the perceived treatment of Anita
Hill during the Thomas confirmation hearings, as well as continuing concerns
about abortion rights and civil rights, as important elements in these electoral
outcomes.241
What do we have in the way of more specific evidence that would suggest
these signals about public opinion altered the behavior of the Court, and in
particular Justices O’Connor and Kennedy? Certainly once piece of evidence
is the Casey case itself. The story of Casey has been told many times and is
without doubt “one of the most extraordinary in the annals of the modern
Supreme Court.”242 For our purposes, the main point is that Justices O’Connor
and Kennedy, both of whom had previously sent signals of disapproval about
Roe, entered into a secretive cabal with Justice Souter to produce a “joint
opinion” reaffirming Roe’s central holding of constitutional protection for
elective abortion. Without advance notice, they sprang the joint opinion on the
other members of the Court immediately after the Chief Justice circulated his
opinion, which was designed to be the opinion for the Court.243 At the end of
the day, the joint opinion became a plurality opinion for the Court. Together
with Justices Blackmun and Stevens, the joint opinion reaffirmed the
constitutional right to abortion; together with the Rehnquist opinion, joined by
Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, the joint opinion upheld all of the
provisions of the challenged statutes, except the spousal consent
requirement.244
240. The 103rd Congress elected in 1992 had a total of fifty-four women (forty-seven
Representatives and seven Senators); the 102nd Congress elected in 1990 had only thirty women
(twenty-eight Representatives and two Senators). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001—THE NATIONAL DATA
BOOK 245 (2001).
241. See Alan I. Abramowitz, It’s Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Presidential
Election, 57 J. POL. 176 (1995) (arguing that abortion was a more critical issue than the economy
in the 1992 election).
242. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLES INSIDE THE REHNQUIST
COURT 156 (1995).
243. LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 473.
244. It is relevant to note in this regard that the outcome reached in Casey corresponds closely
with the abortion control regime preferred by a majority of Americans. The Court’s decision in
Roe followed upon an increase in support for elective abortion within both public and elite
opinion. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 260-62 (1991). Subsequent refinements in the constitutional abortion control regime
tend to track majoritarian views closely. For a recent overview of polling data on abortion,
relating it to different legal issues resolved by the Supreme Court, see Michael Vitiello, How
Imperial is the Supreme Court? An Analysis of Supreme Court Abortion Doctrine and Popular
Will, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 49 (1999). Vitiello reports that, with one exception, the Court’s doctrine
mirrors the preferences of a majority of the public, as reflected in opinion polls. The exception is
spousal consent: The Court has consistently invalidated spousal consents requirements, even
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Some observers have conjectured that Justice O’Connor’s participation in
the joint opinion reflects a concern about her reputation.245 The usual claim is
that O’Connor did not want to be remembered by history as the first woman to
serve on the Supreme Court, with the immediate caveat that she had betrayed
her gender by casting the decisive vote to overturn Roe.246 O’Connor’s overall
record on abortion is consistent with this supposition. In the 1980s, when there
was a solid majority in support of Roe, she wrote opinions that were highly
disparaging of Roe’s trimester framework, and she urged the adoption of an
“undue burden” test that seemed designed to allow her to vote to approve every
statutory restriction on abortion that came before the Court.247 Her attitude
seemed to change in Webster, when she held the balance of power between
retaining or scuttling Roe. There, she wrote a separate opinion that strained to
find a variety of highly restrictive provisions did not pose an undue burden on
the abortion right, even though Justice Scalia was able to show in his opinion
that this was implausible.248 The next year, in Hodgson, she voted for the first
time to invalidate an abortion restriction as being an undue burden.249 Then
came Casey, where she joined the joint opinion that treated Roe as a kind of
core, inviolable constitutional right, although one subject to regulation
provided that it is not an undue burden on the right. What is constant in all this
is the focus on undue burdens; what changes, most decisively in Casey, is the
underlying attitude toward Roe and the way in which the undue burden
standard is applied.
We have no hard evidence, however, that the motivation for this evolution
in Justice O’Connor’s views was concern about her reputation or historical
legacy. That is one possible interpretation. Another is that her sincere views
simply evolved over time. The fact that O’Connor voted with the liberals in
2000 to strike down legislative bans on partial birth abortions250 is consistent

though a majority of the public supports them. Id. at 94-95. The congruence between the Casey
decision and majoritarian views on abortion did not go unnoticed at the time of the decision. See,
e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Justices’ Abortion Ruling Mirrors Public Opinion; Polls Show Americans
Would Keep Procedure Legal, but Are as Divided as Court on Limits, WASH. POST, July 1, 1992,
at A4.
245. Lazarus reports that Justice O’Connor disliked hearing abortion cases because, in the
words of her brother, “half the people will hate her no matter what she does.” LAZARUS, supra
note 85, at 470.
246. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 242, at 156 (“As the first woman on the Court, O’Connor
took her role as a model for other women seriously, and was not eager to cast the fifth vote to
overrule the Court decision.”).
247. See Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obsts. & Gyns., 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
248. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 536 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring).
249. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 458 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
250. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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with the hypothesis that her sincere beliefs about the value of the underlying
right, and about the degree of burden necessary to make a burden “undue,”
have simply changed during her tenure on the Court.
In Justice Kennedy’s case, the about-face in Casey is much more striking,
and more strongly suggestive of insincere behavior. Kennedy joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Webster, which applied a rational basis
test inconsistent with the strict scrutiny mandated by Roe.251 It is reported that
he circulated a memorandum to the other conservative Justices at the time,
stating that he was prepared to vote to overrule Roe.252 His participation in the
Casey joint opinion is quite inconsistent with such a representation. Moreover,
there does not appear to be any linear evolution of views in Kennedy’s case,
since he broke ranks with O’Connor and Souter in the partial-birth abortion
case in 2000 and wrote a rather impassioned dissent urging that partial birth
abortion bans be upheld, reverting, it would seem, to the attitude he held back
in 1989.253
In Kennedy’s case, therefore, there is greater reason to surmise that he was
behaving strategically in joining the joint opinion in Casey and reaffirming
Roe. The most plausible reason for such strategic behavior would be concern
on his part about the Court’s standing in the eyes of the public if it took the
unpopular step of repudiating a constitutional right to abortion. One might also
conjecture that Kennedy was worried about the impact of a decision overruling
Roe on Bush’s reelection chances. This was a reasonable concern, given the
obvious strategic design being pursued by the pro-choice forces in seeking to
have the case decided before the presidential election. But, of course, it is
entirely far-fetched to imagine that Justice Kennedy (or any other Justice)
would decide a case in a particular way in an effort to influence the outcome of
a Presidential election!254
Casey is only one case, of course, although one that loomed very large
both in the eyes of the Justices and the general public. Yet the inferences that
can be drawn from Casey are reinforced by Lee v. Weisman,255 which was
decided only a few days earlier.256 The issue was whether the recitation of a
nondenominational prayer by a member of the clergy at a middle school
graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause. The Court had
previously mustered four votes for a more accommodating approach to such
traditional forms of government-sanctioned religious expression, and with the
251. Webster, 492 U.S. at 498 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy, J.).
252. LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 406-07.
253. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 956 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
254. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
255. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
256. See LAZARUS, supra note 85, at 471 (reporting that Justice Kennedy voted at conference
to reject the constitutional challenge in Lee, but changed his mind while working on the opinion
for the Court and ended up upholding the challenge).
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addition of Justices Souter and Thomas it seemed that the three-part test of
Lemon v. Kurtzman257 would likely be abandoned in Lee. Instead, Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined forces with Justices Blackmun and
Stevens to produce a majority decision reaffirming the strict rule against prayer
in public schools. Justice Kennedy, who had previously been critical of
Lemon,258 deemed it unnecessary in his opinion for the Court to reconsider
Lemon in order to reach this result. Justice O’Connor, who had previously
been critical of Lemon,259 joined a concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun
that went out of its way to reaffirm Lemon.260
The outcome in Lee was probably inconsistent with what a majority of
Americans would want,261 but there is no question that elite opinion was
solidly in favor of the rule banning all prayer in public schools. By switching
sides and reaffirming the strict separationist position, Justice O’Connor and
Kennedy spared the Court from another round of critical editorials. Their
behavior is at least consistent with the public opinion hypothesis.
My modest study of civil rights decisions, previously reported in Table 1,
can also be read as providing inferential support for the public opinion model.
Recall that the study shows that the Court gave much more deference to the
Clinton Administration Solicitor General in civil rights cases in the late 1990s
than it gave to the Reagan Administration Solicitor General in the late 1980s.
This cannot be explained by the separation of powers model; however, it
makes perfect sense in terms of the public opinion model, especially after the
Court had been rebuked by Congress in 1991 for adopting conservative
positions in civil rights cases. The fact that both elected branches of
government signed onto the mass overruling of Supreme Court decisions on
civil rights told the Court—or at least certain key Justices—that its
performance in this area was out of step with public opinion.
Under this explanation for the Court’s more liberal stance on civil rights in
the 1990s, we would expect to find that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
played a key role in assuring that the Court followed the lead of the Solicitor
General after 1994. In fact, when we examine more closely the seventeen
decisions from October Terms 1997-1999 in which the Court accepted the
views of the Solicitor General, we find, as expected, that Justice O’Connor

257. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
258. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
and dissenting).
259. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
260. Lee, 505 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
261. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 145, at 694 tbl.8-23 (reporting that no more than 40% of
respondents to annual opinion polls have ever endorsed the Supreme Court’s decisions banning
prayer in schools).
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voted with the majority in sixteen of these cases. In the one case she did not,
Justice Kennedy took her place.262
A further piece of evidence supporting the public opinion model has
already been mentioned in connection with the discussion of Justice Scalia’s
strategic behavior. It appears from published dissents from the denial of
certiorari during the second Rehnquist Court that the self-restraint shown by
the Court in not granting petitions presenting cases in the social issues basket
has not come from Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
They have periodically gone public with complaints about the Court’s failure
to hear such cases. Rather, the self-restraint appears to be coming from
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.
The most plausible basis for this self-restraint would appear to be
apprehension on the part of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy about the
reputational costs (for themselves and the Court) if the Court agrees to hear
such cases. If Justices O’Connor and Kennedy sincerely preferred to reach
liberal outcomes in these cases, then the votes would easily be there to hear
them. The four liberals alone have the power to grant these cases under the
rule of four. The fact that the liberals do not vote to hear these cases suggests
that they perceive Justices O’Connor and Kennedy as not sincerely preferring
liberal outcomes in these cases. The three most conservative Justices, in
contrast, have indicated by their published dissents that they do want to hear
these cases. This may mean that they believe Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
sincerely prefer the conservative position in these cases. Therefore, the fact
that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy do not want to hear these cases may mean
that they perceive certain costs to flow from the mere fact of considering and
rendering decisions in these cases. Perhaps those costs consist of an unhappy
choice—unhappy at least for Justices O’Connor and Kennedy—between
incurring the excoriation of the liberal media or the excoriation of their fellow
conservatives on the Court, especially the sharp-penned Justice Scalia. To
avoid this unhappy dilemma, they have engaged in strategic behavior—in the
form of resisting adding such cases to the Court’s docket, if at all possible.
The public opinion hypothesis thus allows us to round out our explanation
for the transformation of the Rehnquist Court that occurred around 1994. We
have already seen how the rise of constitutional federalism can be attributed to
the replacement of Justice White by Justice Thomas and by what appears to
have been a strategic decision by Justice Scalia to become a consistent
supporter of states’ rights. We are now in a position to explain why the Court
turned away from social issues at the same time: because Justices O’Connor

262. Only a minority of these cases were 5-4, and some were unanimous. In divided
decisions, however, the most common pattern was for Justice O’Connor to switch sides and vote
with the liberals, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia and Thomas, and sometimes
Justice Kennedy, in dissent.
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and Kennedy found the costs of continuing to engage with these issues in terms
of public opinion to be unacceptably high. The cases that fall in what I have
called the social issues basket—abortion, other privacy rights, affirmative
action, and public expression on religious topics—all involve questions as to
which most people have an ascertainable opinion. The general public opposes
the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas view on only some of these issues—namely,
abortion and privacy rights. There is little doubt, however, that elite opinion as
reflected in major media outlets opposes the conservative judicial view on all
these issues.263
In contrast, although the cases in what I have called the federalism basket
involve issues that are quite controversial among lawyers, so far the public
reaction to these decisions has been nil. As Neal Devins has explained, the
Court’s recent federalism decisions have not prevented Congress from
responding to constituent demands by using other powers like the Spending
Clause. Moreover, because much of what has been struck down is “redundant
of state enactments,” Congress has felt “relatively little constituent pressure to
respond to the Court.”264 Thus, for Justices who are anxious to achieve some
constitutional change that can be described as “conservative” but are skittish
about public opinion and the possibility of backlash against such change, the
states’ rights campaign is virtually ideal.
Although the pieces of the puzzle are now starting to fall together, this still
leaves unexplained several distinguishing attributes of the second Rehnquist
Court—such as the greatly diminished size of the case load, the increase in 5-4
decisions, and the decline in plurality opinions.
To explain these
developments, we need a new theory.
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF MEMBERSHIP FLUX AND STASIS
In order to make a final pass at explaining the differences between the first
and second Rehnquist Court, I will focus on one very obvious institutional
difference: the first Rehnquist Court experienced extensive and frequent
changes in membership, while the second Rehnquist Court has experienced no
change in membership—it has functioned with the same cast of characters now
for over eight uninterrupted years. Neither legal scholars nor political
scientists have paid much attention to the possible significance of membership

263. For an anticipation of this thesis, couched in normative rather than positive terms, see
Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1178 (1988)
(interpreting Bork’s defeat by the Senate in 1987 “as a marker of a failed constitutional moment,
in which a political movement, after raising a new agenda for constitutional reform, fails to
generate the kind of deep and broad support necessary to legitimate a change in” constitutional
law).
264. Devins, supra note 224, at 461.
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flux versus membership stasis in analyzing judicial behavior over time.265 So I
am operating here in largely uncharted territory. Nevertheless, it seems to me
that there are three differences one might expect from a Court in stasis as
opposed to a Court in flux. I will leave to others any attempt to develop these
or other differences into a more formal model, although it seems to me that this
is something that profitably could be modeled and empirically tested.
A.

Receptivity to Change in Institutional Norms

First, a Court in flux is more likely to be amenable to changes in
institutional norms than is a Court in stasis. The Court, like other institutions,
is governed by consensual norms. These include things like the rule that it
takes four votes to hear a case, that opinions are assigned by the senior Justice
in the majority, that the deliberations of the Court take place in secret, and so
forth.266 These norms are generally stable and resistant to change. As Caldeira
and Zorn observe:
[S]ocialization to the behavior of the justices is learned from other justices
upon taking office. Normally, a single justice joins the Court on which sit
eight veterans of the institution. Thus, we expect norms . . . to be propagated
from one generation of justices to the next, . . . imbuing them with longmemory characteristics.267

To the extent the Court’s norms change, we would expect that this will be
associated with changes in personnel. Change in norms requires new ideas and
a willingness to modify established patterns of behavior. New Justices are
much more likely to have new ideas and to be receptive to trying them out than
established Justices will be. Change is probably most likely to occur with the
appointment of a new Chief Justice. Turnover among other Justices, however,
will be important as well since consensual norms are supported by all members
of the Court.268 In contrast, when all nine Justices have sat on the Court for
many years, norm change is highly improbable.

265. An exception is Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual
Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POLITICS 361, 373-74 (1988) (briefly discussing
the possible role of “youth and inexperience” on the Court as contributing to norm change); see
also Timothy M. Hagle, “Freshmen Effects” for Supreme Court Justices, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1142 (1993).
266. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 118-135; Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher
J. W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court, 42 AM J. POL. SCI. 875, 876
(1998).
267. Caldeira & Zorn, supra note 266, at 880.
268. See Walker et al., supra note 265, at 373-74 (noting the possibility that the sudden rise in
the percentage of cases with dissenting and concurring opinions in the Stone Court may have
been due in part to the high percentage of young and inexperienced Justices, and observing that
“[h]igh levels of inexperience may also provide conditions conducive to a breakdown in decisionmaking norms”).
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We can see some confirmation of this hypothesis in the history of the
Burger Court. The Burger Court, like the Rehnquist Court, started off with a
burst of turnover (Burger, 1969; Blackmun, 1970; Powell, 1972; Rehnquist,
1972; Stevens, 1975), and then settled down to a long period of stability (six
years with no turnover from 1975 to 1981). The early years of the Burger
Court were a period of significant change for the Court in terms of its practices
and norms. The time allotted to oral argument was cut in half (thereby
doubling the Court’s capacity to hear argued cases), the number of law clerks
per Justices was doubled (from two to four), the cert. pool was established, and
even the shape of the bench was changed to permit better interaction among
Justices at oral argument.269 In addition, the number of cases heard per Term
jumped up, from around 120 to 150. In the later years of the Burger Court,
there were no institutional changes of equivalent magnitude. A plausible
explanation for this pattern is that during the early years of the Burger Court,
new blood (including a new Chief Justice) brought with it new ideas about how
to discharge the Court’s business, and a receptiveness to adopt these new ideas,
which was missing during the later period of stasis.
This hypothesis about flux versus stasis can, I believe, help to understand
the remarkable reduction in the size of the Court’s docket that we see between
the first and second Rehnquist Courts. A variety of explanations have been
advanced for this phenomenon.270 These theories can be broadly divided into
external and internal theories. External theories, which have been endorsed by

269. See DAVID O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
166 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that the number of law clerks was two per Justice throughout the
Warren Court and increased to three and then four after 1970); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 4 (1990) (describing change in the
shape of the bench); David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the
Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 790 (1997) (tracing origins of
cert. pool to a suggestion made by newly appointed Justice Powell, which was then endorsed by
Chief Justice Burger).
270. For overviews of possible explanations and the evidence for and against each, see
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist
Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403. For longer term trends in the number of opinions issued by the
Court per year, see Post, supra note 22, at 1280. Before the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Court
typically rendered over 200 opinions per year. This fell to a level of about 100 per year during
the Vinson Court, increased to about 120 cases per year during the Warren Court, and then
jumped back up to 150 per year during the Burger Court. This history suggests that the long-term
trend is in the direction of fewer opinions per year (200 per year prior to 1925 to 80 per year
today), but also that significant variations exist from one natural Court to another (for example,
150 per year under Burger to 80 per year under Rehnquist). See also Cordray & Cordray, supra,
at 745-750 (describing how personnel change in the early years of the Vinson Court led to a drop
in the size of the docket from 150 cases per year to about 100 cases per year).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

THE MAKING OF THE SECOND REHNQUIST COURT

641

some of the Justices,271 include such factors as Congress’s repeal of most of
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction in 1988, reduced requests for review filed
by the Solicitor General, reduced activism by lower court judges, a falloff in
new legislation during an era of divided government, and greater ideological
harmony between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. Internal
theories include such factors as increased reliance on the cert. pool by Justices
to screen petitions, a decline in the use of “join-3 votes” by newer members of
the Court,272 and greater pursuit of leisure by the Justices.
Referring back to Figure 2 (in Part II), we can see that the explanation for
the shrinkage in the docket must be to a significant degree internal rather than
external. The change in the size of the docket was a phenomenon of the first
Rehnquist Court, and it occurred quite rapidly and in close connection with
changes in the personnel on the Court. The docket began to shrink shortly
after the ascension of William Rehnquist to the Chief Justiceship and the
appointment of Antonin Scalia as Associate Justice in October 1986, fell fairly
steadily for several years, paused at around 115 cases per year in the early
1990s, and then plunged to a new equilibrium level at around 75-85 argued
cases per year after the retirement of Justice White—before the beginning of
what I have called the second Rehnquist Court.
This pattern is inconsistent with explanations that center on external forces.
If external forces, such as a decline in lower court activism or increased
ideological harmony between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court,
were the primary cause, one would not expect to see such a precipitous drop
followed by a leveling off. In fact, toward the end of the second Clinton
Administration, as the courts of appeals began to include increasing numbers
of Democratic appointees, one could expect to see an uptick as the ideological
harmony started to wear off. There is, however, no sign of such an uptick.273
The one external factor that appears to have some explanatory force is a
reduction in requests for review by the Solicitor General in civil cases starting
in the mid-1980s, which apparently tracks a reduction in the number of losses
experienced by the federal government in such cases in the lower courts.274

271. Justice Souter has publicly suggested that increased ideological harmony between
appeals courts and the Supreme Court may provide part of the explanation. See Shannon P.
Duffy, Inside the Highest Court: Souter Describes Justices’ Relationship, Caseload Trend, PA. L.
WEEKLY, Apr. 17, 1995, at 11.
272. See O’Brien, supra note 269.
273. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 270, at 772.
274. Id. at 763-771. The falloff in government petitions and supported petitions does not
extend to criminal cases. Cordray and Cordray show that the decline in government requests in
the civil area appears to be partly a function of fewer civil suits involving the government, and
partly a function of higher government success rates in the lower courts in civil cases. Id. at 768770.
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This factor, however, accounts for, at most, only about one-third of the
magnitude of the change.275
The internal explanations have a much better claim to explanatory force.
The growing dominance of the cert. pool cannot be wholly eliminated as part
of the explanation. The pool started out with five chambers participating (the
four Nixon appointees to the Court plus Justice White) and four not
participating (Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall).
This
arrangement assured that each petition received close scrutiny by at least one
law clerk (the pool clerk); the fact that four chambers remained outside the
pool and that the clerks in these chambers (at least in theory) reviewed all
petitions independently provided a check on the pool if for some reason the
pool clerk missed a case potentially worthy of review. When Justice O’Connor
was named to the Court in 1981, she joined the pool, increasing the
participation to six chambers. Then, when Justices Brennan and Marshall
retired in 1990 and 1991, their successors (Justices Souter and Thomas) also
joined the pool, bringing the participation up to eight chambers. After 1991,
only Justice Stevens remained outside the pool. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
also joined the pool, but their participation merely kept the level of
participating chambers at eight.
Why might the increasing dominance of the cert. pool lead to a decline in
the number of cases heard by the Court? One possibility is that, with only
Justice Stevens’ chambers now providing a check on the pool clerk, more
mistakes (in terms of missing potentially important cases) go unchecked.
Another possibility might be that, with each pool clerk now writing for eight
Justices of highly diverse views, the pool clerks have adopted a very cautious
approach to assessing cert. petitions. With more responsibility for determining
the cases that make it onto the discuss list, the pool clerks might become more
risk averse, for fear of missing a potential jurisdictional flaw or other weakness
in the case that might emerge later in the process, bringing down ridicule on
their heads. The influence of the cert. pool, however, seems hardly sufficient
to explain fully the decline in the docket. There was no decline when the pool
expanded from five to six (in 1981), and the recent decline began in 1987, well
before the further expansions to seven and then eight took place.276
A better explanation, in my view, is that the decline reflects a new norm
about the standards that should be applied in determining whether a petition
qualifies for Supreme Court review—a new norm implanted with the changes

275. Id. at 764. Cordray and Cordray estimate that the decline in civil petitions by the
Solicitor General is responsible for a reduction in about fifteen cases per year, and a decline in
petitions supported by amicus briefs filed by the Solicitor General for about ten cases per year.
Id. This would account for about twenty-five cases out of a total decline of about seventy-five
cases per year in the size of the docket.
276. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 270, at 792-93.
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in personnel that began in 1986, which then spread and became entrenched as
other new Justices came on board throughout the first Rehnquist Court. This is
consistent with the findings of other scholars who have examined the available
data, each of whom has concluded that the most plausible explanation for the
shrinkage in the docket is that the Justices “have been applying a different—
and more rigorous—standard in deciding whether to hear the cases.”277
The question is: Who is the agent of change that convinced the Justices on
the first Rehnquist Court to adopt a more rigorous standard in assessing cert.
petitions? Ordinarily, one would point to the new Chief Justice as the most
likely influence in generating a new norm of institutional practice such as the
standard for reviewing cert. petitions. The Chief Justice is responsible for
putting together the initial discuss list of petitions that receive the full attention
of the Conference, and he leads off the discussion of the cases that are put on
the list. The Chief, therefore, undoubtedly has more influence over the size
and composition of the Court’s docket than any other individual. Also, the
timing of the shrinkage is consistent with the hypothesis that Rehnquist is
responsible: The Court’s docket began to shrink within one year of his
elevation to Chief Justice.
There is no evidence, however, that William Rehnquist assumed the office
of Chief Justice with any intention to cut back on the number of cases heard by
the Court. As an Associate Justice, Rehnquist was a frequent filer of dissents
from denial of certiorari, implicitly advocating that more, rather than fewer,
cases be heard.278 On the eve of his appointment, he published an article
bemoaning the inability of the Court to decide more cases and urging the
creation of the National Court of Appeals to take up the slack.279 Moreover, at
his confirmation hearings in 1986, he told the Senate “I think the 150 cases
[per year] that we have turned out quite regularly over a period of 10 or 15
years is just about where we should be at.”280
In contrast, we know from published reports that Justice Scalia, from his
early years on the Court, strongly favored reducing the number of cases heard
by the Court in order to allow more time for each case and improve the quality

277. Hellman, supra note 270, at 425. Accord Cordray & Cordray, supra note 270; O’BRIEN,
supra note 269, at 166.
278. See Arthur D. Hellman, Preserving the Essential Role of the Supreme Court: A Comment
on Justice Rehnquist’s Proposal, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 15, 26 (1986) (noting that during his last
eight years as Associate Justice, Justice Rehnquist “published a dissenting opinion or notation in
more than 120 cases in which the Court denied review”).
279. William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 10-14 (1986).
280. Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States:
Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 143 (1986) (statement of
Hon. William H. Rehnquist).
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of the Court’s deliberations.281 We also know, based on docket sheets released
as part of Justice Marshall’s papers, that Justice Scalia voted to grant review
less frequently than any other Justice on the first Rehnquist Court through the
1990 Term.282 Although Scalia joined the Court at the same time as Rehnquist
was elevated to the Chief Justiceship, Scalia’s voice on certiorari policy was a
new one. Thus, it is my opinion, although I admit it is only an educated guess,
that Justice Scalia is the change agent here. In other words, when Justice
Scalia joined the Court in 1986, he threw himself with typical gusto into the
effort to convince the Justices to adopt a more restrictive standard of review.
His arguments had little effect on the older Justices fixed in their ways, like
Powell, Brennan, Marshall, White and Blackmun. As these Justices retired,
however, and were replaced by new Justices with no pre-established views
about the appropriate standard of review, Scalia’s ideas about the standard of
review—and hence the proper size of the docket—gradually prevailed.283
I am not inclined to attribute any deep strategic significance to what I have
surmised to be Justice Scalia’s advocacy of a smaller case load. The decline
has little to do with the politically-significant cases, which are too few in
number to explain the shrinkage of the docket we have witnessed. What has
happened is that the number of more routine cases involving statutory
interpretation and civil and criminal procedural rights issues has been cut
roughly in half.284 If pressed to explain Justice Scalia’s motivation for wanting
to get rid of half of the lower-profile cases, I would suggest that it may have
something to do with the fact that he is heavily involved in drafting and
revising the opinions that issue under his name. The prospect of doing this
against a base of 150 decisions a year is far more exhausting than doing so
against a base of 80 decisions a year. Other Justices who joined the Court
during the first Rehnquist years, including Justices Souter and Breyer, are also
heavily involved in the opinion-production process. So they too might
welcome relief from having to produce their share of an extra seventy
opinions, most of which involve rather routine and unexciting issues.285
281. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ruing Fixed Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1988, at A16 (reporting
comments by Justice Scalia in a question-and-answer session at George Washington University
Law School).
282. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 270, at 785 n.242.
283. Cordray and Cordray report that through the 1990 Term, Justice Kennedy had the
second-lowest number of votes for certiorari after Justice Scalia. Id.
284. See Hellman, supra note 278, at 26.
285. Another factor that may be relevant here is the recent custom of appointing only current
court of appeals judges to the Supreme Court. Doris Provine’s research suggests that a key
variable in determining a Justice’s propensity to vote to hear cases is his or her level of trust in the
ability of lower court judges to reach fair results. DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 116-17 (1980). Thus, Justices Black and Douglas had a
generally low opinion of lower court judges and felt it was important to keep a close watch over
them. They voted to hear a large number of cases. Justices Frankfurter and Burton, in contrast,
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Better Information

Another consequence of the difference between a Court in flux and a Court
in stasis is the amount of information that the Justices have about the
preferences (defined broadly to include legal philosophy) of the other Justices
on the Court. The Justices never have perfect information about the
preferences of the other Justices. They must act on subjective estimates of the
probability that the other Justices will take certain positions in each case.
These subjective estimates are continually being updated with each case the
Court decides as it sits together. The longer a given Court sits together, the
more accurate the probability estimates that each Justice will make regarding
the other Justices.
The process by which a Court of nine Justices continually updates
probability estimates of the preferences of other Justices can be described by
analogy to Bayesian logic.286 Thus, we can say that each Justice starts with a
certain estimate of the prior probability that another Justice will take a
particular position x* with respect to issue y*. As cases are decided that are
related to the issue in question, such as y’, the Justices develop subjective
probabilities that express the likelihood that a person who takes position x’ as
to y’ will also take position x* as to y*. After observing the position that the
Justice actually takes on y’, the other Justices then revise their estimate of the
prior probability that the Justice will take position x* with respect to y*,
developing a new posterior probability. This process continues until the Court
actually considers issue y*, at which time the Justice’s true position as to y*
(x* or not x*) is finally revealed.
To make this more concrete, consider the situation when David Souter is
first appointed to the Court. The other Justices are all anxious to develop an
were less sensitive to the plight of the petitioner, and concerned themselves primarily with the
systemic significance of the case. They voted to hear many fewer cases. It is possible that the
recent fall off in certiorari grants may reflect a similar shift in attitudes toward lower court judges
and a corresponding move away from the importance of error correction in the management of
the Court’s docket. Each of the six new Justices named to the Court from 1986 to 1994 had
previously served as a federal court of appeals judge. In contrast, a number of the Justices they
replaced (Rehnquist, Powell, Brennan, and White) did not have such experience. Prior service on
the court of appeals may be correlated with an attitude of greater trust toward lower court judges.
Thus, as we move toward a Court in which a higher percentage of Justices have had such prior
lower court service, the overall propensity to grant review may decline.
286. For a general introduction to Bayesian logic, see Richard D. Friedman, Assessing
Evidence, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1810 (1996). There is an extensive debate as to whether or to what
extent it is accurate to model ordinary trials as following Bayesian logic. See Ronald J. Allen,
Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 INT’L. J. OF EVIDENCE &
PROOF 254, 263-71 (1997). Whatever one thinks about trials, it may be that the process by which
Supreme Court Justices develop estimates of the preferences of their colleagues is less
problematically described as Bayesian in nature because the “evidence” unfolds in a highly
structured, incremental fashion.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

646

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:569

estimate of the probability that Souter will vote to overrule Roe v. Wade. Each
of the other Justices starts with some information about Souter—that he was a
Rhodes Scholar, he is a bachelor, he served as a criminal prosecutor in New
Hampshire before becoming a judge, he was appointed to the Court by
President Bush, and so forth—and on the basis of this fragmentary information
develops a preliminary estimate of the probability that Souter will vote to
overrule Roe. The other Justices then observe Souter as he sets to work
deciding cases with them. If a case arises presenting a substantive due process
question, for example, they will observe closely to see whether he is
comfortable invoking that doctrine (on which Roe is based). In effect, they
develop a likelihood ratio for whether a Justice who is comfortable applying
substantive due process will vote to overrule Roe. Once they observe his
behavior in the substantive due process case, they then revise their original
estimate of whether he will vote to overrule Roe. Then another case arises,
presenting a question of how much weight to give to stare decisis in
constitutional law. The Justices each develop another likelihood ratio for
whether someone who is willing to overrule such a constitutional precedent
will vote to overrule Roe. They then observe how Souter behaves in this case
and revise once again their estimate of the probability he will vote to overrule
Roe. The process proceeds in the fashion, with each Justice presumably
developing a more accurate estimate of probability of Souter’s decisive vote as
the decisional process unfolds.
The point of all this is that the accuracy of the estimates of positions on
potential issues that each Justice has about the other eight Justices will differ
significantly on a Court in flux than on a Court in stasis. For a Court in flux,
each new appointment means that the other Justices must start from scratch
developing estimates of probabilities for the new Justice’s position on a host of
issues.
How long will it take before the other Justices develop a reasonably
accurate picture of the new Justice’s preferences? No doubt, the answer varies
for each new Justice. If Robert Bork had been confirmed as an Associate
Justice in 1987, it would have taken relatively little time for the other Justices
to ascertain his views on a number of controversial issues, compared to, say,
the time it took to size up Justice Kennedy.287 There is reason to believe,
however, that for the ordinary fledgling Justice the period of acclimation—and
287. Bork was rejected by the Senate, of course, precisely because his views on controversial
topics were relatively predictable. The lesson of the Bork episode is that, at least during a time of
divided government, the President is better advised to nominate persons to the Court whose views
are unknown or middle-of-the-road. This means persons who will take a relatively long time to
signal their views to other Justices. Thus, to the extent that future Presidents continue to follow
the strategy of appointing persons of unknown or moderate views to the Court, we can expect that
the efficiency of the Court likely will be disrupted to a relatively large degree during periods of
flux, as it apparently was during the first Rehnquist Court.
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hence the period of uncertainty for the other Justices—is usually more than just
a few years. Justice White was fond of quoting Justice Douglas to the effect
that “it takes five years to go around the track once.”288 The point of the
remark is that it takes five years for a new Justice to become reasonably
acquainted with the legal doctrine that pertains to the full menu of issues that
come before the Court, to gain familiarity with the other Justices’ positions on
these issues, and to stake out a personal position. If this is correct, then a Court
that sits together for five years and longer should begin to perform in ways
qualitatively different from Courts that experience normal turnover.
What this means, in practical terms, is that the Justices on a Court in flux
will make more “mistakes” about the positions of other Justices than will the
Justices on a Court in stasis. The senior Justices on a Court in flux will be
operating with inaccurate estimates of the positions of the junior Justices, and
the junior Justices may be operating with somewhat inaccurate estimates of the
positions of the senior Justices (assuming that one gains information from
personal interaction that goes beyond what can be gained by studying prior
opinions). The mistakes created by this incomplete information will take many
forms: Justices will vote to grant certiorari predicting a particular outcome on
the merits when the outcome turns out differently; the Chief Justice or the
Senior Associate Justice will assign opinions assuming a certain mode of
analysis when the analysis turns out differently; and Justices will draft
proposed opinions for the Court assuming at least four supporting votes when
it turns out that there are less than four supporting votes. In a word, a Court in
flux will perform less “efficiently” in generating new law than will a Court in
stasis.
These conjectures provide a possible explanation for how it is that the
second Rehnquist Court could decide a higher percentage of cases by 5-4
margins, while simultaneously reducing the percentage of cases that result in
plurality decisions. Plurality opinions can be seen as potential 5-4 opinions
that fail to make the grade because of incomplete information about the
preferences of at least four other Justices. Given the high premium placed on
securing five votes for a single opinion in support of the judgment, we can
assume that immediately after Conference on a case the Justices voting in the
majority would nearly always like to see at least five votes for a single
rationale. If they fail to achieve this result, then the reason in most cases is
because someone miscalculated the views of one or more of the others. The
first Rehnquist Court, as a Court in flux, was more likely to be plagued by
these kinds of mistakes, and, hence, was behaving as expected in producing

288. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 76, at 349. Justice White, according to his biographer,
said that Justice Douglas attributed the remark to Chief Justice Hughes, id., suggesting that at
least three Justices serving at different times and having different temperaments (White, Douglas,
and Hughes) agreed with this assessment.
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relatively fewer 5-4 decisions and relatively more plurality decisions. As the
membership of the second Rehnquist Court remained unchanged and the
Justices came to have more and more information about each other’s
preferences, the number of mistakes declined, resulting in a mounting number
of 5-4 decisions and a declining incidence of plurality decisions.
One would never expect the Court to eliminate all plurality opinions
because novel issues have a way of popping up (such as the constitutionality of
term limits or the line item veto), as to which there will inevitably be
uncertainty about the positions of the Justices. Also, some Justices’ views may
change over time, creating another source of uncertainty. Nevertheless, all else
being equal, a Court in stasis should be more efficient at turning coalitions of
five votes for a judgment into five votes for a single opinion of the Court, and
this is what we in fact have seen in recent years on the Rehnquist Court.
C. Bonds of Reciprocity
It is likely that a Court in stasis differs from a Court in flux in ways more
profound than simply having better information about the preferences of each
of its members. A Court that sits together for a long period of time is more
likely to develop coalitions that feature stronger bonds of cooperation and
reciprocity. This, at least, would seem to be a plausible prediction suggested
by the literature on game theory. That literature indicates that participants in
infinitely-repeated games are more likely to adopt cooperative strategies than
are participants in single-play games or games with fixed termination points.289
This literature further indicates that games of uncertain length will, in this
respect, tend to resemble infinitely-repeated games.290 If it is plausible to think
of the Supreme Court as being engaged in a strategic game of uncertain length
played by nine Justices, then one would predict that over time the participants
in this game would tend to evolve cooperative strategies or conventions. More
specifically, one would predict that a coalition of at least five Justices would
form and would cooperate in reaching outcomes in contested cases, that the
cooperation within this coalition would persist, and that the range of cases over
which the coalition cooperates would very likely expand as the game
progresses.
If Supreme Court decision making can be modeled as a game, it is
obviously an extraordinarily complex one. If one were searching for a simple,
two-party game on which to begin to think about coalition building on the
Supreme Court, it might be “stag hunt.” In this game, there are two hunters,
who must decide whether to hunt for a stag or a hare. Each hunter can catch a
289. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); MICHAEL
TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
(1987).
290. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 167 (1994).
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hare on his own, but it takes two working together to kill a stag. The payoff
from sharing in half a stag, however, is worth more than the payoff from
catching a hare. In this game, “[t]he hunters’ interests do not conflict. Each
prefers to hunt stag, but only if the other does—and neither can be certain that
the other will. Stag hunting will take place only if each is assured that the
other will hunt stag.”291 Analogously, one can say that groups of Justices who
agree on the judgment in a case have a choice between writing separate
opinions reflecting their own individual sincere views that justify the result, or
joining a single opinion that reflects the shared views of at least five Justices.
Writing separately (like killing a hare with certainty) has some payoff—one’s
views may be applauded by law review writers and conceivably may lead to a
change in law some day. Joining an opinion for the Court, however, (like
sharing in the kill of a stag) has a much larger payoff since this produces a
binding precedent. Obtaining the higher payoff, however, requires cooperation
if it is to be achieved.
The exact mechanism by which an extraordinarily complex, nine-player
game of uncertain duration would generate an equilibrium of cooperative
behavior is unclear, and such an outcome is by no means guaranteed. The
players may eventually learn of the benefits of cooperation by trial and error,
or they may stumble upon strategies like tit-for-tat (in which players respond to
cooperation by rewarding the cooperator and respond to defection by
punishing the defector), which may conduce toward cooperation.292 The
relevant point for present purposes is that whatever the precise mechanism by
which cooperation comes about, if the game is sufficiently complex and has
multiple players, it presumably takes time to achieve a cooperative
equilibrium. A Court in flux is less likely to achieve such an equilibrium
because the introduction of new players disrupts the expectations and strategies
of the other players, requiring in effect that the game start over. A Court in
stasis, in contrast, may be able to sustain enough rounds of play so that
cooperation becomes the dominant and stable strategy within a coalition of at
least five Justices.
A number of distinguishing features of the second Rehnquist Court, such
as its domination by a single five-Justice coalition, its greater willingness to
declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, its superior capacity to achieve
doctrinal innovations, and its greater ability to avoid plurality decisions, may
plausibly be explained on the hypothesis that the Court, by the very reason of
its stability over a long period of time, has reached a state in which the
majority coalition enjoys stronger cohesion than one would expect to find
within majority coalitions on Courts that experience normal turnover. The
growth in 5-4 decisions and the decline in plurality decisions, on this theory, is
291. Id. at 36.
292. AXELROD, supra note 289, at 54.
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not just a function of greater precision into predicting the positions of other
Justices, as suggested earlier. It is in addition or, alternatively, a function of
the emergence of a convention shared by the members of the primary coalition.
One especially intriguing implication is that the majority coalition on the
Rehnquist Court may be expanding the sphere of cooperation beyond the
original core of constitutional federalism to incorporate a wider variety of
issues. There have been a number of signs that this may be happening in
recent Terms. For example, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,293 the majority
coalition engaged in an expansive interpretation of the First Amendment in
order to preserve the Scout’s policy against openly gay scout leaders.
Furthermore, in the most recent Term, the same five Justices held together to
uphold school voucher programs against the allegation that this represents
impermissible public funding of religion.294
By far the most interesting illustration of how the original sphere of
cooperation may be expanding over time is the controversial decision in Bush
v. Gore,295 where the Court, defying expert predictions, intervened in the legal
free-for-all over the unresolved presidential election in Florida and, in so
doing, awarded the Presidency to George W. Bush. As reconstructed by
Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns,296 the Court was divided into four
groups of Justices immediately after the second oral argument in the
controversy. On the right, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas wanted to reverse outright the Florida Supreme Court’s recount
decision as a violation of Article II. On the left, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
wanted to affirm outright. In the middle, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
were dubious about the Article II argument, but felt that the Florida court’s
recount raised equal protection concerns. Also in the middle, Justices Souter
and Breyer agreed that the Florida decision raised equal protection concerns,
but they would have remanded to the Florida courts with directions to conduct
a recount that was consistent with equal protection principles. The question
was whether Justices O’Connor and Kennedy would join forces with Justices
Souter and Breyer in an equal protection ruling with a remand, or whether
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy would form a coalition with the three most
conservative Justices on some basis.
What happened, as we know, is that O’Connor and Kennedy fell in with
the three committed conservatives. The three conservatives evidently
compromised on legal theory, joining a per curiam opinion that adopted the
equal protection rationale and relegating their Article II theory to a concurring

293. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
294. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
295. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
296. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political
Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849 (2001).
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opinion. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, for their part, agreed that the
disposition in the per curiam opinion would be a reversal rather than a remand,
thereby ending the recount and awarding the Presidency to George Bush.
There are a variety of possible explanations for why Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy decided to join the three conservatives rather than try to form a
coalition with Justices Souter and Breyer.297 Surely one possible explanation,
however, is that by late 2000, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy had become
thoroughly familiar and comfortable with forming coalitions with the
conservatives. Dense bonds of reciprocity had formed among the five most
conservative Justices, and cooperation—which entailed both some compromise
by the three conservatives on the legal theory and may have entailed some
compromise by O’Connor and Kennedy on the remedy—was relatively easy to
achieve. Cooperating with Justices Souter and Breyer was less familiar and,
hence, more difficult. Thus, we see how something as simple as the judicial
longevity of a Court may have fateful consequences.
VII. CONCLUSION
I have covered a lot of ground, which makes summing up more than
ordinarily difficult. Let me close by emphasizing three lessons this exercise
may offer: one for lawyers, one for political scientists, and one for both.
The lesson for lawyers is that they should be more cautious about
attributing the behavior of the Supreme Court to the influence of legal ideas.
From a jurisprudential perspective, the Supreme Court over the last eight years
looks like an institution on a mission. Five Justices appear to have dedicated
themselves to the revival of states’ rights as a bedrock principle of
constitutionalism, and they have pursued this vision with single-minded
determination. It seems natural to attribute this behavior to the Justices’
commitment to ideals of federalism. This type of explanation, however, leaves
many scratching their heads, for it is doubtful that significant numbers of
Americans, at this point in our history, care very much about constitutional
federalism. In this sense, the current Rehnquist Court reflects the rather odd
spectacle of a Court on a mission, but without a popular mandate.
The puzzle may be easier to explain if we start not with ideals, but with the
assumption that the Justices rationally are seeking to maximize certain
preferences. At least, I have attempted to argue that the puzzle is explainable
in these terms. We are having a federalism revolution because, given the mix
of motives and strategies among the nine Justices, it is basically the only
revolution to be had.

297. One, of course, is that joining with the three conservatives created a majority of the
Court; whereas joining Souter and Breyer still left the “equal protection” Justices one vote short
of a majority.
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This is not to suggest that lawyers should forgo normative analysis of legal
questions. That is their job. I do think, however, that normativity could use a
healthy dose of realism now and then. Understanding the preferences and the
strategies that lie behind the jurisprudence may provide insights into what
kinds of arguments are likely to succeed and why, and it may give us some
sense of how permanent the jurisprudential preferences of the current Justices
are likely to be.
The lesson for political scientists, I think, is that different theories of
judicial behavior may apply in different degrees to different Justices. There is
a tendency in the political science literature to seek out some universal model
for judicial behavior, to the effect that all judges behave reflexively, or all
engage in strategic behavior of one stripe or another. The truth may be far
more complex. Some Justices—Justice Blackmun perhaps—may be highly
reflexive and give little thought to how other Justices and institutions will react
to their decisions. Other Justices—like Justice Brennan—may be intensely
strategic. Within the ranks of the strategic, some strategic Justices will be
more sensitive internally to other Justices, while others may be more focused
externally on public opinion.
My study of the second Rehnquist Court is illustrative. It may be that the
five-member coalition for states’ rights is composed of two Justices who are
relatively attitudinal or reflexive—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas; two Justices who are strategic in the sense that they are fleeing to
federalism because of their fear of public opinion if they concentrate on other
issues—Justices O’Connor and Kennedy; and one Justice who is a strategic
federalist of the internal actor variety because he cannot get any action on any
other front—Justice Scalia.
Again, I am not suggesting that political scientists should forego
reductionistic models in favor of historical or biographical narratives. Building
and testing reductionistic models is what political scientists do. It is quite
possible, however, that in studying an institution like the Supreme Court,
where the behavior of each individual plays such a critical role in the
performance of the institution, a more complex or multi-dimensional theory of
judicial behavior will have more explanatory power than a single-dimensional
theory.
Finally, a lesson for both lawyers and political scientists is that far too little
attention has been given in the past to the rate of turnover on collegial courts.
One can distinguish three states of affairs: normal turnover, which historically
has been about one new Justice every two years; above normal turnover; and
subnormal turnover. The first Rehnquist Court was a Court of above normal
turnover; the second Rehnquist Court a Court of subnormal turnover. I have
argued in a preliminary fashion that a Court with above normal turnover is
more likely to experience important changes in institutional inputs—the norms
that govern institutional behavior. A Court with subnormal turnover is more
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likely to develop stable and powerful coalitions that produce important
changes in institutional outputs—the legal doctrine produced by such Courts.
Given the closely divided nature of the Rehnquist Court and the divided
government and society in which it operates, I think it is very unlikely that the
Court would have generated the important changes in the law of constitutional
federalism we have seen in the last eight years without the added boost from
subnormal turnover. This is surely a phenomenon that deserves greater study
in the future, by both lawyers and political scientists—hopefully in
collaboration.
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APPENDIX A
Cases Underlying Figure 3
Cases 1985-1994
Abortion

Cases 1995-2002

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).

Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497
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